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Chapter I: Introduction and summary 
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“In the department of economy, an act, a habit, an institution, a law, gives birth not only to 
an effect, but to a series of effects. Of these effects, the first only is immediate; it manifests 
itself simultaneously with its cause — it is seen. The others unfold in succession — they are 
not seen: it is well for us, if they are foreseen” (Bastiat, 1850) 
This thesis is motivated by the wish to balance the public debate on regulation. Even in 
market-based economies, individuals are surrounded by public regulations. This is what 
economists refer to as command-and-control instruments. In its most basic definition, “a 
regulation is a law that seeks to change behavior in order to produce desired outcomes, and it 
does this by requiring or forbidding certain actions (McLauglin, 2013, p. 2). 
By choosing the word “balance” I here refer to the fact that command and control regulations 
- like allocating additional public funds - are often called for as they are very effective in 
order to achieve an end deemed to be socially desirable. McLauglin (2013) claims that there is 
an intrinsic drive for regulation to accumulate over time as the political system often reacts to 
perceived crises, new technologies and other undesirous events by creating new regulations.  
However, there are costs to regulations, which are perhaps less visible and hence less present 
in the minds of policymakers and voters. An obvious source of costs is related to compliance. 
Regulations also create opportunity costs, a concept which French economist Bastiat (quoted 
above) was the first to introduce. He used the famous example of a broken window to 
illustrate the problem. In this parable, he juxtaposes the value created as the glazier is hired to 
fix a shop-keeper’s broken window (effect which he refers to as “seen”) with the value lost as 
the shop-keeper now cannot spend this money elsewhere (effect which he refers to as 
“unseen”). In a modern and succinct language, opportunity cost is productive activity 
foregone because scarce resources are devoted to regulatory compliance (McLaughlin, 2013). 
Also, it should be noted that regulation intrinsically restricts choices of those regulated. While 
this may lead to beneficial outcomes in the future both for the regulated and third parties, this 
fact should not be forgotten as most will agree that free choice is an important value.   
A constructive public debate on regulations relies both on the acknowledgment of the benefits 
as well as the costs of existing regulations and regulatory options. Furthermore, as the number 
of different regulations grows and the economy gains in complexity, simply acknowledging 
that there are two sides to the regulatory coin will not be enough. Careful scientific 
evaluations and re-evaluations are necessary to get a complete picture of all actions set in 
motion by a policy making decision. Bastiat wrote that secondary effects of regulations can 
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only become visible through experience or foresight. Using his words; when foresight is 
difficult, learning from experience becomes more important. 
This book aims to teach public and policy-makers about the seen und unseen effects as well as 
regulatory options of a particular form of regulation – occupational licensing – by using the 
German crafts experience. National occupational licensing schemes have been steadily on the 
rise since the Second World War, in both Europe and the US (see Kleiner, 2006; and Kleiner 
and Kueger, 2010). For reference, about 30% of the American workforce is employed in 
professions subject to such regulations. The German crafts sector has been subject to a 
licensing requirement for self-employment since the 1950’s in its current form, however for 
several crafts trades this requirement was relieved or abolished in 2004 in order to cater to 
European goals of integrated, free markets.  
To achieve this goal, this first introductory chapter of the book provides background 
information: It details the different theoretical approaches to occupational licensing, explains 
the occupational licensing scheme in the German crafts sector, introduces the reader to 
methodological challenges when trying to learn from the German experience and details the 
content, contributions to the literature and insights in the chapters to follow. 
1. The controversy surrounding occupational licensing 
Occupational licensing can be analyzed within two different theoretical frameworks that rest 
on opposite assumptions with regards to the existence of market failure and the market’s 
ability to autocorrect them. This leads to different predictions of the effects of occupational 
licensing and finally also contrasting balance sheets on the social welfare effects of 
occupational licensing schemes.  
A first approach sets on competition to maximize welfare and is fundamentally critical to state 
interventions. A central thesis in Stigler (1971) is that regulation as a rule is designed, put in 
place and operated primarily for the regulated industry’s benefit. Also, Tullock (2004, p. 213) 
points out the “even in those cases where the government regulation was fairly clearly 
motivated by a desire to help some particular group, it is usually turns out that at least some 
features are not to the advantages of the benefitted group”. 
The underlying assumption for this view on occupational licensing is that there are no market 
failures such as information asymmetries, which the unregulated market itself cannot resolve. 
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Indeed, even though producers may have an immediate upper hand in terms of information, 
the market will by itself reinstate the balance of powers. Various mechanisms that do not 
involve the government can reduce consumers’ search costs in order to obtain their desired 
quality of products and services such as such as advertising, labeling, screening, reputation 
effects and voluntary certification (see e.g. Ippolito and Mathios, 1990; Dranove and Jin, 
2010; and Cabral, 2012). 
In regulated markets on the other hand, the compulsory qualification is a market entry barrier, 
which for the professionals themselves constitutes a fixed cost (see Branstetter et al., 2014). 
The higher this cost, the fewer professionals will pay to enter the market and hence the 
smaller total supply will be. Because of less competition, prices will rise above marginal 
costs. As a result, producers receive an economic rent and the total quantity produced in the 
market will be suboptimal, see Kleiner (2006). Since competition works as a sanctioning 
mechanism for poor-performing producers, another negative outcome of this process may be 
lower average quality offered in the regulated market. Hence, according to this thesis, 
occupational licensing schemes lead to welfare loss. 
The second approach is rooted in the economics of information. The crucial assumption here 
is the opposite of the one taken by the proponents of market solutions: There are strong 
information asymmetries between consumers and producers that cannot be surmounted by the 
agents themselves. In the case of the crafts, there may be particular reason to suspect 
important information deficits. Leland (1979) showed that in particular service markets are 
prone to imperfect information. The specific nature of particular tasks makes the search for 
information about quality difficult for consumers. Also, services – as opposed to goods – are 
purchased before they are produced, which also complicates the task for consumers. Lastly, 
consumers have less experience with low frequency purchases, such as house refurbishments, 
hence information handicaps on the demand-side for such transactions seems plausible.  
Economists have shown that market outcomes are sensitive to consumer information 
acquisition possibilities (see e.g. Salop and Stiglitz, 1977, 1982; Varian, 1980 and Wilde, 
1980). Akerlof (1970) points out that when consumers are unable to evaluate quality ex-ante, 
i.e. in presence of asymmetric information, a “market-for-lemons” problem emerges, whereby 
the highest quality producers continuously leave the market since the consumers are only 
willing to pay the average price quoted, which does not cover their costs. Leland (1979) 
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generalizes this finding by showing that all open markets with asymmetric information will 
underprovide quality relative to what is socially optimal. 
By ensuring certain quality standards, an occupational licensing scheme prevents these 
problems and, hence, a complete opposite conclusion is reached in this second approach: 
Occupational licensing leads to welfare gains.  
2. The German crafts case 
The German craft sector provides researches with a golden opportunity to contribute to the 
empirical literature on the economic effects of occupational licensing since the traditional 
licensing scheme in this sector was recently reformed in a way that resembles a natural 
experiment. Hence, one can improve upon the existing literature, which relies solely on cross-
section regression, by using difference-in-difference estimation.  
Moreover, a better understanding of the developments in the crafts sector is important for the 
German policymaker since it constitutes an important part of the total economy. The German 
crafts sector comprises about 5 million professionals in 93 trades, which make up about 12% 
of the working population (Federal Statistical Office, 2016). Also, the use of occupational 
licensing in the crafts sector is still part of the German policy debate.  
The Trade and Crafts Code (Handwerksordnung)
 1
 in its current institutional framework 
regulates this sector. From 1953 to 2004, it stipulated that only craftsmen with a Meister title 
could found a company. The Meister is the highest degree of vocational training. In order to 
acquire it a professional must first undergo basic training that typically lasts 3 years as well as 
additional training and associated exams that yields occupation specific knowledge and 
knowledge of business management and pedagogy. In line with European efforts to create a 
common market area with free labor mobility, the crafts regulation was liberalized in 2004. 
Since then, market entry in certain trades has been open, although craftsmen in these trades 
can still choose to acquire the Meister title. In the remaining trades however, the licensing 
requirement remains fully or partially intact.   
A number of empirical studies on the effects of the reform have been published in recent 
years. In summary, this literature provides the policymaker with the following insights: 
                                                          
1
 It should be noted that the German crafts legislation is not formally a state regulation as it was the instated by 
the crafts chambers with the state’s blessing. In practice, it is however equivalent to a law initiated by the state.  
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Removing occupational licensing leads to market entry, especially of low-qualified craftsmen 
(see Rostam-Afschar 2014; Runst et al., forthcoming; and Koch and Nielen). Market exit has 
also been shown to increase (see Runst et al. forthcoming). Income effects are significant – 
though nevertheless quantitatively small – and hint at the elimination of a monopoly rent as a 
result of the regulation (Lergetporer et al., 2016; Damelang, 2017). Regarding education, the 
number of Meister certifications – previous market entry barrier in the deregulation 
professions - has decreased (Koch and Nielen, 2017). Also, in-company vocational training 
has gone down as a result of removing occupational licensing (Runst and Thomae, 2018).  
Most of these studies solely rely on difference-in-differences estimation to obtain estimated 
reform effects. However, in contrast to laboratory experiments, natural experiments such as 
the German crafts reform rarely fulfill the random treatment condition. This means that the 
difference-in-differences estimator may not actually be able to identify casual effects.  
3. The pitfalls of econometric analyses  
Difference-in-differences estimation is a very popular methodology among economist 
researchers in order to gauge the effects of policy interventions. With good reason as it can 
help circumvent the problem of unobserved heterogeneity. However, in order to identify 
causal effects, the standard difference-in-differences estimator does require that, in absence of 
the treatment, the average outcomes for the treated and control groups would have followed 
parallel trends over time. This so-called parallel trends assumption is therefore the crucial 
identifying assumption for difference-in-differences estimation to be appropriate. 
It is not possible to test whether the parallel trends assumption holds. O’Neill et al. (2016) 
therefore recommends “that the base case analysis should present results from the method(s) 
that uses the ‘most plausible’ identification assumption, but then the sensitivity analysis 
should present findings from method(s) that make alternative, but still ‘somewhat plausible’ 
identification assumption. None of the existing empirical studies on the effects of the German 
2004 deregulation do this.  
This calls for robustness-checks of the established findings using data driven procedures to 
construct the best possible counterfactual. In the policy evaluation literature, the synthetic 
control method has often been applied for this purpose (see e.g. Abadie et al., 2010; Kreif et 
al., 2016; O’Neill et al., 2016; and Peri and Yasenov, 2018).  
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The general principle behind the synthetic control method is to weight the outcomes of the 
comparison units in order to construct a better counterfactual for the treated unit in absence of 
the treatment, with the weights being chosen such that the synthetic control best reproduces 
the outcome variable of the treated unit in the pre-treatment period.  
Synthetic control estimations have several advantages. This method can still identify causal 
effects when the effects of unobserved confounders vary over time since the comparison 
group is reweighted so that it has similar characteristics as the treatment group. Also, it is a 
very transparent methodology since it is apparent whether the treated unit is sufficiently 
matched by the synthetic control and, on this basis, the analyst can decide whether or not to 
go forth with the analysis. 
The synthetic control method is however not full-proof. In cases where the parallel 
assumption does hold, the difference-in-differences estimator does provide the best results 
(O’Neill et al., 2016) and alternative methods will yield biased results in this case (Angrist 
and Pischke, 2009; O’Neill et al., 2016). The safest bet therefore appears to be to present 
findings using different methodologies. It is only when these findings all go in the same 
direction that one can claim to have truly learnt from experience.  
The chapters of my thesis will shed new light on the German crafts case. The presence of 
search costs in the now deregulated sector will be examined in order to assess whether a 
market-based approach to reduce information asymmetries can be successful and weaknesses 
in the existing empirical literature on the reform will be addressed using alternative 
methodologies.  
4. The chapters 
The second chapter of this book entitled “"Masterful Meisters? Voluntary Certification and 
Quality in the German Crafts Sector", examines consumers’ search for information about 
quality in the segments of the German crafts sector that were deregulated in 2004. Chapter 
two contributes to the literature by being one of very first studies looking into the effects of 
voluntary certification and the only one examining this regulatory option in the case of 
Germany and in the case of the crafts. 
The study empirically analyses whether the optional Meister certificate offers useful 
information about quality to consumers of deregulated crafts services. The main challenge 
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herein lies in the measure of quality. A novel approach is taken by exploiting data from an 
online market platform for crafts services (MyHammer). After the job has been completed, 
consumers can leave an online rating about the crafts company that they employed on 
MyHammer, which is used as a measure of service quality. A second measure of quality is 
considered to be the time spent on the platform, since in the presence of market selection, 
high-quality crafts companies are more likely to continue using the MyHammer platform.  
The data is analyzed using a cross-sectional linear regression, an ordered logit model, a 
truncated regression model and survival analysis. Across all empirical specifications, it is 
found that the Meister certification is perceived as a token of quality. We interpret this as a 
sign that the voluntary certification scheme in deregulated crafts trades reduces information 
search costs for consumers. 
The third chapter of this book entitled “Does occupational licensing really impact incomes? - 
The German crafts case” examines the income effects of the German reform in 2004. Most 
existing studies on the income effects of occupational licensing rely on cross-section 
estimates and are therefore likely to be biased due to unobserved heterogeneity. Furthermore, 
the studies on the German crafts sector using difference-in-differences estimation do not 
rigorously define the population of interest. Chapter three contributes to the literature on the 
link between licensing and incomes by improving upon the methodology used and the 
interpretation of the findings in these studies. Most notably, a more rigorous approach to 
identifying the crafts by combining occupation codes with data from the German Federal 
Institute for Vocational Education and Training on the share of crafts apprentices within each 
occupational code is used. 
Surprisingly, no robust income effects as a result of the German 2004 deregulation are 
detected. It is suggested that demand-effects and market saturation have so far been 
inadequately discussed in the literature. While the economic reasoning in previous studies 
focuses on the mechanism whereby market entry barriers lead to higher prices and hence 
increase producers’ incomes, other mechanisms that counterweigh this may be at work. It is 
possible that there may have been no – or very low – economic rents in licensed occupations 
to begin with. Several contributions in the literature have challenged the Cournot theorem, 
according to which a competitive equilibrium only occurs as the number of firms proceeds to 
infinity (see e.g. Fama and Laffer, 1972; Stiglitz, 1987 p. 1042; and Bresnahan and Riess, 
1991). Moreover, the demand-side should also be considered. Quality may be lower in non-
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competitive markets, which over time could have reduced consumers’ willingness to pay for 
the service. 
The forth chapter of this book entitled “Are estimates of the “natural experiment” in the 
German crafts sector causal?” investigates whether results in the literature on the 2004-reform 
using difference-in-differences estimation hold up when methods to construct an improved 
counterfactual are used. More specifically, it re-examines the effects of the 2004 deregulation 
on market entry and exits, the share of migrants and incomes using the synthetic control 
method. It contributes to the literature by being the only one to apply synthetic control 
estimation in this particular policy case. 
It is found that using synthetic control estimation does not significantly alter conclusions 
drawn based on difference-in-differences estimations, although some additional information 
was revealed.  
Finally, the fifth and final chapter of book is entitled “Ökonomische Effekte der 
Deregulierung der Handwerksordnung im Jahr 2004 (author’s note: Economic Effects of the 
Deregulation of the Crafts Legislation in the Year 2004)”. It is an encompassing summary of 
policy insights on the economic effects of removing occupational licensing based on the 
entire research literature on the German deregulation of the crafts sector in 2004. This 
literature concludes with the fact that market competition has increased as a result of the 
reform. Whether this implies increased consumer welfare will depend on the long-term 
developments in the quality of services and, most importantly, whether available crafts 
services in the future are in line with consumer preferences. 
5. Conclusion 
As mentioned in the beginning of this introductory chapter; the ambition of this book is to 
inform the public debate about the seen and unseen effects of occupational licensing. The 
reader may rightfully ask: “Is there a need for such enlightenment?” 
On the 24
th
 of July, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung – one of Germany’s largest 
newspapers – wrote an article entitled “the return of the Meister-obligation”. Here, Germans 
could read that their elected representatives are now starting to doubt whether the 2004-
deregulation was appropriate. They fear that quality of crafts services as well as human capital 
accumulation in coming crafts generations is going down. On the other hand, a scientist 
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interviewed still applauds the increased competition as a result of removing occupational 
licensing. No published study is cited and no conclusion is given. Hence, there does appear to 
be a need for scientific evidence for the many and diverse economic consequences of 
removing occupational licensing in the German crafts sector, which is what the chapters that 
now follow will provide. Some of these effects are more visible in the German policy debate 
than others. 
A meticulous reader will here point out: “So you inform the public of all these implications of 
occupational licensing, but will you give the answer as to whether the Meister-obligation 
should be reinstated in the deregulated occupations or perhaps overall be made history”. This 
book is a so-called positive analysis. Like in so many other cases in the social sciences we are 
faced with policy trade-offs. Whether a licensing requirement is appropriate will depend on 
how we value different policy goal against each other. This is a normative question which no 
scientific paper can conclude on.  
Even with this response the most inquisitive audience may not be satisfied. “But having read 
and written on the topic during 3 years, what is your personal opinion on occupational 
licensing in the German crafts?” I believe the crafts sector is so diverse that a single 
regulatory scheme for all trades may not be desirable. In the case of backers, putting 
competition and innovation at the forefront appears logical, whereas for craftsmen installing 
complex heating structure in buildings that will last for decades, prioritizing quality assurance 
seems like a good idea.  
As for a general rule of thumb, I have throughout the years of writing this book, truly become 
aware that regulating the economy is complicated business. It therefore seems judicious to 
consider all regulatory options – including doing nothing – before venturing down this rocky 
road. Furthermore, my belief in gathering insights from experience – by exploiting natural 
experiments or, where none exist, by creating policy experiments – has been strengthened. 
Large scale regulatory interventions should not be merely a response to public outcries or 
transitory events.  
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Abstract 
Voluntary certification systems potentially reduce search costs in markets with imperfect 
information. Service markets with many heterogeneous firms – such as the crafts market – are 
prone to information imperfections and can therefore potentially benefit from such 
informational mechanisms. We examine if the Meister qualification in the German crafts 
sector improves service quality as perceived by consumers. We find a significant and positive 
relationship between the Meister title and consumer ratings and conclude that the certificate is 
a credible sign of quality.  
JEL Classification: I28, J24, L51  
Keywords: Transaction Costs, Search Costs, Voluntary Certification, Service Quality 
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1. Introduction 
In Germany, a reform of the crafts regulation in 2004 – motivated by the aim to increase 
competition by lowering entry barriers – abolished or lessened the old licensing scheme for a 
number of crafts trades. In the deregulated trades, the Meister title (an advanced vocational 
certificate) is now voluntary and no longer a prerequisite to enter the market. Following the 
reform, popular concerns have been uttered regarding the effectiveness of an optional Meister 
certificate to safeguard consumer protection in Germany
2
 and some German political parties 
demand the reintroduction of occupational licensing.
3
  
Occupational licensing legislation has indeed been justified by claims of minimum quality 
protection (Kleiner, 2006). Licensing may in fact be beneficial for consumer protection. For 
instance, when quality information is not readily available to consumers, or if search costs are 
prohibitively high, as in the case in markets with strong information failures (see e.g. Akerlof, 
1970; and Leland, 1979), as when there is extreme uncertainty over product or service quality 
as a result of many diverse suppliers being present in the market.  
While service markets such as the crafts market may be particularly prone to information 
imperfections and higher search costs, there are a number of potential mechanisms which 
could lower search costs for customers, such as advertising, labeling, screening, reputation 
effects and voluntary certification (see e.g. Ippolito and Mathios, 1990; Dranove and Jin, 
2010; and Cabral, 2012), with the latter being the focus of this paper.  
We examine whether the optional Meister certificate offers useful information about quality 
to consumers in German crafts trades, which are no longer subject to a licensing requirement. 
We estimate the effect of having the Meister certificate on service quality in deregulated 
crafts trades as perceived by consumers conditional on firm-specific controls. Our finding – 
consistent across all empirical specifications – is that the Meister certification is perceived as 
a token of quality. We interpret this as a sign that the voluntary certification scheme in 
deregulated crafts trades reduces information search costs for consumers.  
 This study is organized as follows. Part two motivates the study by discussing information 
availability and search costs in the German crafts market, as well as the role of the Meister 
                                                          
2
 Traublinger (2014); “Meisterbrief und Meistervoraussetzung: Basis eines starken, innovativen handwerks”, in: 
Ifo Schnelldienst, 16/2014. 
3
 “CDU will Meisterzwang reanimieren” Handelsblatt, 13.11.2016. 
18 
 
certificate in this context. Part three presents the methodology and the data used. Part four 
lists the results, before part five concludes by discussing the results from a policy perspective.  
2. Background 
Stiglitz’s (2000, p. 1441) essay on the academic contributions of economics of information 
states that “it is now recognized that information is imperfect, obtaining information can be 
costly, there are important asymmetries of information, and the extent of information 
asymmetries is affected by actions of firms and individuals”. Our study addresses the cost for 
consumers related to information procurement, i.e. search costs. The topic is important 
because economists have shown that market outcomes are sensitive to consumer information 
acquisition (see e.g. Salop and Stiglitz, 1977, 1982; Varian, 1980 and Wilde, 1980)
4
. 
The term “search” was first introduced in the economic literature by Stigler, who depicts it as 
“canvassing various sellers” (Stigler 1961, p. 213). Nelson (1970) defines “search” as all 
ways in which consumption options are evaluated. Consumers can search for quality as well 
as price. This paper focuses on the search for information about quality. Again according to 
Nelson (1970), information about quality is more costly for consumers to obtain than 
information about prices. 
There are good reasons to believe that high search costs characterize the German crafts 
market. Service markets such as crafts markets (e.g. hairdresser and optician services or paint 
jobs) are prone to imperfect information (see e.g. Leland, 1979). First, crafts services are non-
standardized. Quality not only varies among craftsmen but also depends on the specific 
conditions of the task (e.g. the shape and condition of a roof). In other words, the specific 
nature of particular tasks makes the search for information about quality costly for consumers. 
Second, services – as opposed to goods – are purchased before they are provided. This means 
that consumers cannot observe quality before a purchase, which complicates the search. As it 
is impossible to assess quality directly, the search process may include indirect sources of 
information. Examples are other people’s evaluations or the checking of educational 
certificates, such as basic or advanced vocational training degrees. Finally, low frequency 
purchases, such as house refurbishments, are also associated with higher search costs (see 
Nelson, 1970).  
                                                          
4
 According to Stiglitz (2000, p. 1455), studies on price dispersion under imperfect information “showed that 
even […] an epsilon [small] search costs could dramatically change the nature of the market equilibrium”. 
19 
 
Information availability and search costs in the German crafts market may have been affected 
by the deregulation in 2004, which removed the traditional licensing scheme that mandated a 
Meister degree
5
 (an advanced vocational certificate) for market entry in selected crafts trades. 
In the affected trades, a voluntary certification scheme has taken its place whereby craftsmen 
stand free to acquire a Meister degree or not and consumers choose whether or not to 
purchase from certified craftsmen. 
Studies have documented the increased market entry – predominantly of craftsmen without 
professional qualification – as a result of the reform (see Rostam-Afschar, 2014; Rostam-
Afschar, 2015; Runst et al., 2016; and Koch and Nielen, 2016). Hence, the crafts market is 
now more competitive and the service providers are more diverse in terms of their formal 
qualification than before. Theoretically, therefore, the growth in competition may increase 
consumer surplus by lowering market prices and forcing competitors to strive for higher 
quality. However, new market entrants and increased supplier diversity may also increase 
search costs (see Smith et al., 1999). It follows that higher search costs may reduce the 
positive effects of increased competition. 
The effects on consumers of removing occupational licensing appear therefore theoretically 
undetermined. With regard to the situation in Germany, two points are worth noting. The first 
point is that “it is unlikely that the number of self-employed will increase in a further de-
regulation in occupations where the share of self-employment is already quite high” Rostam-
Afschar (2015, p. 21/22). The second point is that various mechanisms that inform consumers 
may also limit the negative implications of search costs resulting from the de-regulation and 
market development that has taken place. These include reputations, labeling, minimum 
quality standards and certification. Our focus is certification and we examine if the ‘Meister’ 
certificate can reduce search costs in this market. 
Exhaustive economic analysis of the German crafts case has been difficult since there is no 
avaible data on the quality of the Meister education (see Rostam-Afschar, 2015). This author 
states that “more evidence on quality and quality uncertainty are needed” (p. 48). 
Furthermore, it is difficult to rely on evidence from other countries. Empirical studies on 
professional voluntary certification schemes are scarce and center on the case of teachers in 
the US (see Kane et al., 2008; Boyd et al., 2007; and Croninger et al., 2007). Since the effects 
                                                          
5
 Acquiring the Meister title requires advanced vocational training, which is internationally recognized as tertiary 
education open only to individuals who have completed apprenticeships or upper secondary vocational schools 
(see Schneider, 2008, for more information on the German education system). 
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of certification may be both institution- and market specific, it may not be possible to 
generalize about them.  
There are two channels through which the German Meister certificate – which is easy for 
consumers to observe – may lower search costs. First of all, higher quality may be a result of 
higher innate abilities. In this case, the Meister certificate acts as a signal of quality because 
lower-ability individuals face higher costs in the completion of the qualification and will 
therefore choose not to pursue this goal (Spence, 1974). According to the signaling 
hypothesis, the Meister degree does not increase skill, but simply serves as a sorting 
mechanism. Second, the Meister degree may actually be a productivity enhancing mechanism 
through which human capital is acquired and individuals become more productive. This is in 
line with the Becker human capital theory, (see Becker 1964).  
In this paper, we estimate the effect of having the Meister certificate on service quality in 
deregulated crafts trades as perceived by consumers. As stressed in e.g. Caswell and Anders 
(2009), the effectiveness of certification systems depends on the trust placed in them by 
consumers. This also depends on existing and significant quality differences between certified 
and non-certified companies. When this is the case, search costs for consumers are reduced.  
3. Data and methods 
A general lack of attention in the empirical literature on quality effects of professional 
qualification has been explained by the difficulty in establishing correct measures (see 
Kleiner, 2000). We use a novel approach to estimate the effects of having a Meister title on 
service quality as perceived by consumers by exploiting data from an online market platform 
for crafts services (MyHammer).  
Crafts companies sign contracts with MyHammer for a given period and a given price, which 
varies between the different packages that MyHammer offers. The average contract price is 
59 Euros (65 Euros when free trials are excluded), which corresponds to 0.12 Euros per day. 
The crafts companies can then respond to – and compete for – demands for crafts services that 
consumers place online. Craftsmen may also be contacted directly by consumers who are 
interested in the company’s profile on the platform. After the job has been completed, 
consumers can leave an online rating about the crafts company that they employed on 
MyHammer. 
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On entering the platform, craftsmen provide various types of information about their company 
and activities. MyHammer has provided us with this data – including all customer ratings – 
for all contracts signed from May 1, 2013 to October 29, 2015. For information about when 
the companies first entered the platform, the data goes back to 2009.  
As we are interested in the effects of voluntary certification, we would like to limit our 
sample to only deregulated trades.
 6
 The activity classification in the data differs from that in 
the official crafts legislation. Therefore, we proceed by first removing activities with a very 
high Meister share from the sample (above 80%). Second, we exclude companies that are not 
member of a crafts chamber, which is compulsory for crafts companies in Germany. Hence, 
we exclude from the sample companies that are clearly trades still subject to occupational 
licensing and companies outside the crafts sector. Furthermore, we remove activity 
classifications whose names are almost identical to trades that are still subject to licensing in 
the official crafts legislation. After this data cleaning, we are left with 5,144 firm observations 
and an average of 35,196 ratings for four indicators of customer satisfaction. Descriptive 
statistics of our data are presented in table 1.  
  
                                                          
6
 The final sample include the following activities (w/share of Meister-companies in the considered activity 
classification): "Windows, doors, frames, shutters (23%)", "tiling (9%)", "painting, varnishing (39%)", "various 
flooring (8%)" and "interior decoration (12%)".  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean St.d. 
Meister 0.41 0.49 
Employees 0 0.39 0.46 
Employees 1-3 0.39 0.49 
Employees 4-9 0.18 0.34 
Employees 10-20 0.04 0.15 
Employees 21+ 0.01 0.09 
Einzelunternehmen (fully liable) 0.84 0.37 
GmbH (limited liability) 0.08 0.26 
UG (limited liability) 0.02 0.15 
GbR (full liability) 0.04 0.19 
Other  0.02 0.14 
Foundation year 2006 12.68 
Employing a trainee 0.04 0.19 
Liability insurance 0.09 0.28 
Entry in 2009 0.03 0.16 
Entry in 2010 0.11 0.32 
Entry in 2011 0.08 0.27 
Entry in 2012 0.08 0.27 
Entry in 2013 0.20 0.40 
Entry in 2014 0.30 0.45 
Entry in 2015 0.21 0.41 
Overall Rating 2.61 0.35 
Quality Rating 4.64 0.39 
N 5,144*   
*N=3,483 for the variable ‘foundation year’, N=2,614 for the overall rating variable and N=2,552 for the 
quality rating variable. 
 
According to the German Federal Statistical Office, overall there were 578,013 crafts 
companies in Germany in 2013, which means that our full sample is a mere 1 percent of the 
overall population. We have used the official crafts data to assess the representativeness of 
our sample (see table 2). For most variables, our sample is true for the overall population. 
Exceptions are the average age of the companies, which is much younger in our sample, and 
the qualification level, which is much lower in our sample.  
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Table 2: Sample representativeness 
Share of  MyHammer Overall population 
Meister 41% 75% 
Employees 0 39% 28% 
Employees 1-3 39% 33% 
Employees 4-9 18% 20% 
Employees 10-20 4% 11% 
Employees 21+ 1% 7% 
Einzelunternehmen (fully liable) 84% 67% 
GmbH (limited liability) 8% 23% 
UG (limited liability) 2% 1% 
GbR (full liability) 4% 8% 
Other  2% 1% 
Foundation after 2004 72% 28% 
Employing a trainee  4% 14% 
N 5,144* 583,668 
* N=3,483 for the variable ‘foundation year’ 
 
3.1 Main variables 
Altogether, there are four rating variables in the dataset. These are an overall rating variable 
and three specific rating variables where the customer judges quality, friendliness and 
reliability. For the overall rating variable, the customer can give a “negative”, “neutral” or 
“positive” rating of the service rendered, which we numerate on an ordinal scale from 1 to 3. 
The more specific ratings are scaled from 1 to 5, with one being the least content and five the 
most content. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the ratings. Only about one-third of the 
companies have received a rating and the number of ratings per company varies from 1 to 
601, with a mean of 11 ratings (see figure 2).  
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Figure 1: The number of ratings per company 
 
Figure 2: The distribution of the rating variables 
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Given that using online ratings to overcome the problem of measuring quality is an innovative 
approach, we expect – and therefore pre-empt – certain questions related to the 
meaningfulness of our dependent variable. Strategic manipulation (discussed in e.g. 
Dellarocas, 2003) can occur in theory, whereby online reviews are falsified or online 
identities are misused. However, since MyHammer only permits consumers who have had 
interactions with craftsmen on the platform to submit a rating, this problem is substantially 
reduced.
7
 There may also be quality aspects that are unobservable to consumers or only 
become visible over time. However, our data measures short- and medium-term quality 
observable to consumers. It is reasonable to expect a strong correlation between observed and 
unobserved quality, although this correlation cannot be calculated.  
The order of ratings may also have an influence on the average quality rating, given that a 
negative first review may prevent subsequent sales and hence yield a lower average rating 
than would have been the case with a positive initial rating and subsequent accumulation. 
This problem is diminished by the fact that high-quality companies have a higher probability 
of obtaining a positive first review compared with low-quality companies and are, therefore, 
more likely to keep accumulating ratings. In this way, the influence of one negative review on 
the average outcome is reduced.  
The qualification variable is constructed by MyHammer based on documents provided by the 
companies (Meister certificate if they have it and/or membership in a local crafts chamber
8
). 
Altogether, one-quarter of the companies in the sample have the Meister certification.  
We use a variety of empirical estimations to explore the data, namely a linear regression 
model, a random effects ordered logit model, a negative binomial model, a truncated 
regression model and finally survival analysis.  
3.2 Initial models 
We start our data analysis with a cross-sectional linear regression where the dependent 
variable is the average rating obtained by each firm. The independent variable of interest is 
the qualification variable (having a Meister title or not). Additionally, we control for the 
number of employees, the legal status, the year of firm establishment as well as the year of 
                                                          
7
 We conduct robustness checks where we exclude all companies from the sample that have three or less ratings, 
which does not change the results.   
8
 Not all companies using MyHammer are crafts companies.  
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entry onto the online platform, having liability insurance and employing a trainee. We also 
include regional and sector controls. The sector controls are important since we estimate an 
average effect over a range of different crafts activities, i.e. heterogeneous markets. For the 
same reason, we calculate clustered standard errors since our observations are likely to be 
correlated within certain groups (i.e. type of activity). 
We continue the data analysis with a random effects ordered logit model. Here, the data is 
organized as a panel where the time dimension is the sequence of consumer ratings and the 
dependent variable is each rating obtained by each firm on either a 1-3 Likert scale (in the 
case of the overall rating variable) or a 1-5 Likert scale (in the case of the specific rating 
variables). The independent variable of interest is again the Meister qualification variable and 
the controls are identical to those in the cross-sectional linear regressions. Again, we calculate 
cluster-robust standard errors.  
The advantage of using a panel specification is that by including each rating, as opposed to 
calculating an average rating, we remain true to the original format of the dependent variable, 
as well as having many more observations than in our linear model. Since the activity 
classification in the dataset is relatively broad (each type of activity contains several distinct 
crafts trades), the sector controls are unlikely to capture all market-specific effects and 
therefore unobserved heterogeneity is likely to be present in our model. The random effects 
ordered logit approach models unobserved heterogeneity as a function of time-invariant 
characteristics, including time-averaged regressors, with an additive error term that is 
assumed to be independent of the model’s covariates (see e.g. Muris, 2016).  
If voluntary certification actually increases quality as perceived by consumers, high-quality 
Meister companies (especially market incumbents) may not have such a strong need to build a 
high quality reputation via online ratings. This might explain why Meister companies are 
under-represented on MyHammer in the first place. We estimate a negative binomial model 
where the dependent variable is the total number of consumer ratings received by each firm to 
ascertain whether there is a difference in rating accumulation among Meister and non-Meister 
companies.  
An important limit to these initial models stems from the skewness of the rating variables. 
Few poor ratings
9
 in the data mean little variation in our sample. It is also likely to mean that 
                                                          
9
 For instance, the mean scores for the three specific rating variables were 4.7, 4.6 and 4.6, respectively. 
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our sample is not fully representative of the quality of German crafts services. There are 
strong reasons to suspect that poor performers are under-represented. Resnick et al. (2006) 
study reputation effects on eBay and note that consumers only tend to rate when they are 
satisfied as sellers’ ratings are positive 99% of the time. Furthermore, quality-related selection 
mechanisms may be at work. Company owners who consider their own quality to be low may 
not enter the MyHammer platform in the first place because low ratings will lead to fewer 
contracts (self-selection). Poor-quality companies that choose to enter the platform are likely 
to realize the sanctioning effect of customer ratings relatively quickly and leave after a short 
time (market selection), whereas companies providing higher quality services are likely to 
stay longer on the platform. 
Since issues related to selection effects are likely to appear in our sample, we proceed by 
estimating a truncated regression model, which is appropriate in cases where observations 
above or below a given threshold are systematically excluded from the sample. We also 
supplement with a survival model that – instead of looking at ratings – identifies the factors 
that influence the total time spent on the platform by each company.  
3.3 Extensions 
In the presence of self-selection, low-quality companies are likely never to enter the 
MyHammer platform. A common method in the literature addressing sample selection bias is 
the Heckman selection model (see Heckman, 1976). However, in our case the Heckman two-
step estimator is not feasible since we have no information about the truncated observations. 
Instead, we estimate a simple truncated model, which is appropriate when sample data is only 
obtained for a subset (in our case, higher quality companies) of the true population (in our 
case, both high- and low-quality companies) (see e.g. Greene, 2008). We use the same setup 
for our truncated model as for the linear regression model, meaning that the dependent 
variable is the average consumer rating obtained by each firm.  
In our case, truncation due to any self-selection happens from below since the probability of 
being on MyHammer should decrease with the prospect of accumulating bad ratings. 
However, there is no predetermined quality level at which the truncation begins. Therefore, 
we estimate multiple truncated regression models where the truncation begins at different 
values. The ratings on MyHammer are scaled from 1-3 (overall rating) or 1-5 (quality rating). 
Altogether, 92% of consumers have given the top overall rating (3) and 94% of consumers 
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have given the two best quality ratings (4 and 5). Therefore, we use both 1 and 2 as the lower 
bound for the overall rating variable and 1, 2 and 3 as the lower bound for the quality rating 
variable.  
In the presence of market selection, high-quality crafts companies are more likely to continue 
using the MyHammer platform. By changing our dependent variable from customer ratings to 
the number of days spent on the MyHammer platform, we can use survival analysis to 
estimate the effects of the covariates from the previous specifications, particularly the 
qualification variable. We are able to improve our observation number by including 
companies that have never been rated in the sample. 
The focus of survival analysis is time-to-event (in our case, the number of days between the 
date when crafts companies enter the MyHammer platform and the date when they leave). We 
calculate the Kaplan-Meier survival function, defined as S(t) = 1 - F(t ) = P(T ≥ t), which is 
the probability of surviving past time t (see e.g. Wooldridge, 2002). In order to estimate the 
effect of the Meister title, we calculate common parametric survival models (i.e. Exponential, 
Weibull and Gompertz regression coefficients. We control for company size, legal status, the 
year of firm establishment as well as having liability insurance and employing a trainee. 
Again, we also include regional and sector controls.  
Censoring – defined in Cleves et. al (2010, p. 29) as “when the failure event occurs and the 
subject is not under observation” – is a challenge in survival analysis. Right-censoring 
happens when subjects do not experience the event (here leaving the MyHammer platform) 
within the duration of our study (see Cleves et. al, 2010). This is a common case and does not 
pose a problem for the validity of results as long as the censoring is independent of the 
probability of the event (see Prinja et al., 2010). We consider that the assumption of 
independent right-censoring holds in our case. Left-censoring happens when the event occurs 
prior to the subject entering the study (see Cleves et al., 2010). In our case, this is not a 
problem since the observation period for each company begins at the date when it enters the 
MyHammer platform.  
As before, we fear unobserved heterogeneity in our data. It has been shown that the influence 
of the observed covariate is underestimated when the presence of omitted covariates is 
ignored (see e.g. Chamberlain, 1985). As suggested by Jenkins (2008), we therefore run a 
frailty-model assuming both a Gamma and an inverse Gaussian distribution – as is commonly 
used for continuous time models. However, since the relevant likelihood ratio test does not 
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reject the null hypothesis that the frailty component equals zero, we also present estimates 
using the non-frailty model.  
4. Results 
4.1 Masterful Meisters 
Basic descriptive statistics of our dataset suggest a positive association between our 
qualification variable and our rating variables. Among the companies that have an overall 
rating above the mean (2.7), 20 percent have the Meister certification. In comparison, the 
share of certified companies among those that have very low ratings (below 1.5) is 0.2 
percent. All of our empirical models confirm this intuition.  
We discuss the linear model and the random effect ordered logit model together as they yield 
similar results. To facilitate the reading of the result tables, we only show the results for the 
overall rating variable as well as the quality rating variable as dependent variables, although 
the results for the other specific rating variables are consistent with the results presented.
10
  
  
                                                          
10
 Furthermore, estimations conducted using the full sample of all companies on MyHammer regardless of sector 
(also not presented) tell a similar story, albeit with slightly higher and more significant effect sizes.   
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Table 3: Linear regression model 
  
Overall 
rating 
Quality 
rating 
Meister 0.04** 0.08* 
Employees 1-3 -0.03* -0.04 
Employees 4-9 -0.19*** -0.16*** 
Employees 10-20 -0.10 -0.30* 
Employees 21+ -0.15 -0.74* 
GmbH (limited liability) -0.05 -0.08 
UG (limited liability) -0.12* -0.13 
GbR (full liability) -0.02 0.01 
Other -0.06 -0.15 
Sector controls Yes Yes 
Geographical controls  Yes  Yes 
Foundation year -0.00 -0.00 
Liability insurance  0.03 0.03 
Employing a trainee 0.00 -0.07 
Entry in 2010 -0.01 -0.05 
Entry in 2011 0.04 -0.04 
Entry in 2012 0.05 0.02 
Entry in 2013 0.04 0.01 
Entry in 2014 0.08 0.09 
Entry in 2015 0.07** 0.10 
Number of reviews 0.00 0.00 
R-square adjusted 0.02 0.02 
N 1,928 1,883 
*,**,*** correspond to 10, 5, and 1 percent levels of statistical significance. 
 
Qualification consistently has a significant impact on ratings. The linear estimate of our 
Meister variable OLS varies from 0.04 to 0.08, meaning that having a Meister in the company 
adds 0.04 to 0.08 to the average consumer rating obtained (see table 3). While this may seem 
like a small effect size, one must keep in mind that most ratings made are between 2 to 3 
(overall rating) and 4 to 5 (quality rating). The logit estimates for the qualification variable are 
also significant (see table 4). According to the average marginal effect calculations, Meister 
companies have a 2% higher probability of achieving the best overall rating and a 3% higher 
probability of achieving the best quality rating (see table 5). It is interesting to note that 
Meister companies have a lower probability of achieving the second-best quality rating, 
meaning that they appear to deliver the very best in terms of quality. In terms of the predicted 
probabilities of achieving a given rating (displayed in table 6), a first observation is that 
independent of qualification companies have a very high probability of achieving the best 
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rating, which is a result of the skewness of the rating variable. However, there is a difference
11
 
in the predicted probabilities according to qualification. Meister companies have a 93% 
chance of achieving the best overall rating as opposed to 91 % for non-Meister companies, 
while they have 83% chance of achieving the best rating as opposed to 80 % for non-Meister 
companies.  
Table 4: Random effects ordered logit model 
  
Overall 
rating 
Quality 
rating 
Meister 0.32** 0.21** 
Employees 1-3 -0.45** -0.15* 
Employees 4-9 -0.88*** -0.49*** 
Employees 10-20 -1.40*** -0.78*** 
Employees 21+ -0.51** -1.24* 
GmbH (limited liability) -0.27 -0.29 
UG (limited liability) -0.86** -0.42* 
GbR (full liability) -0.27 -0.01 
Other -0.88** -0.41* 
Sector controls Yes Yes 
Geographical controls  Yes  Yes 
Foundation year -0.01 0.00 
Liability insurance  0.24 0.09 
Employing a trainee -0.18 0.10 
Entry in 2010 -0.07 0.04 
Entry in 2011 0.14 -0.24 
Entry in 2012 -0.01 -0.11 
Entry in 2013 0.10 -0.01 
Entry in 2014 0.59** 0.21 
Entry in 2015 0.66** 0.28* 
Number of reviews 0.00 -0.00 
Prob >chi2 0.00 0.00 
Cut1 -23.79 0.78 
Cut2 -23.18 1.00 
Cut3   1.28 
Cut4   2.69 
N 29,863 27,619 
*,**,*** correspond to 10, 5, and 1 percent levels of statistical significance. 
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 Equal to the estimate of the qualification variable in table 5. 
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Table 5: Random effects ordered logit model: Average marginal effects 
  Overall rating Quality rating 
  Rating=1 Rating=2 Rating=3 Rating=1 Rating=2 Rating=3 Rating=4 Rating=5 
Meister -0.01** -0.01** 0.02** -0.01** -0.00** -0.00** -0.02** 0.03** 
Employees 1-3 0.02** 0.01** -0.03** 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.01* -0.02* 
Employees 4-9 0.04*** 0.01*** -0.05*** 0.02*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.04*** -0.07*** 
Employees 10-20 0.06*** 0.02*** -0.08*** 0.03*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.06*** -0.11*** 
Employees 21+ 0.06** 0.02** -0.08** 0.05*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.10*** -0.17** 
GmbH (limited liability) 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.04 
UG (limited liability) 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02* 0.00 0.01* 0.03* -0.06* 
GbR (full liability) 0.04** 0.01** -0.05** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
Other 0.04** 0.01** -0.05** 0.02 0.00 0.00* 0.03* -0.06* 
Sector controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geographical controls  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Foundation year 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
Liability insurance  -0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 
Employing a trainee 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 
Entry in 2010 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 
Entry in 2011 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.03 
Entry in 2012 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.02 
Entry in 2013 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
Entry in 2014 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 0.03 
Entry in 2015 -0.03** -0.01** 0.04** -0.01* -0.00 -0.00* -0.02* 0.04* 
Number of reviews 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06* 
*,**,*** correspond to 10, 5, and 1 percent levels of statistical significance. 
   
Table 6: Random effects ordered logit model: Predicted outcomes 
 
Overall rating  Quality rating 
 
Probability 
Rating=1 
Probabilty 
Rating=2 
Probability 
Pating=3 
Probability 
Rating=1 
Probability 
Rating=2 
Probability 
Rating=3 
Probability 
Rating=4 
Probability 
Rating=5 
Meister companies 0.046*** 0.025*** 0.928*** 0.036*** 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.220*** 0.825*** 
Non-meister 
companies 0.059*** 0.030*** 0.911*** 0.043*** 0.009*** 0.015*** 0.135*** 0.798*** 
N  29,863 29,863 29,863 27,619 27,619 27,619 27,619 27,619 
*,**,*** correspond to 10, 5, and 1 percent levels of statistical significance.         
 
Turning to the control variables, employing one or more additional workers affects customer 
satisfaction negatively. An explanation resembling a principal-agent problem could be put 
forward for this result. That is that smaller companies are more transparent and each person 
feels more responsible for the company and therefore has higher incentives to be concerned 
with quality service provision.  
33 
 
Furthermore, the companies’ legal form appears to matter for customer ratings (at least in the 
logit model). Being an UG (stock corporation) has a mostly significant and negative effect on 
ratings relative to the comparison group, which is Einzelunternehmen (sole trader or sole 
proprietorship). The effect of being a GmbH (private limited company) seems to proceed in 
the same direction. We find that this result is reasonable given that sole traders or proprietors 
are held 100 percent personally liable for the financial situation of the company. As such, they 
will have an additional incentive to be concerned with service quality. The effect of being a 
GbR (a company constituted under civil law) is mostly insignificant, corroborating our 
explanation as the owners of such companies also stand personally financially liable.  
The variables for the geographical location of the company, the year when it was founded, 
whether it employs trainees, whether it has liability insurance as well as the number of ratings 
it has received on MyHammer are not significant. The fact that the foundation year proved 
insignificant should reduce concerns related to sampling as the main difference between 
MyHammer companies and the rest of German crafts companies is the companies’ age.  
Furthermore, having a Meister has a significant and negative effect on rating accumulation 
(see table 7), although the size of the estimate is very small, with Meister companies 
accumulating on average half a rating less. This is consistent with the finding that certification 
affects quality as perceived by consumers. In this case, certified companies are less dependent 
on reputation mechanisms to fill their order books. The advantage that online platforms offer 
such companies is primarily to obtain first contact with consumers. The experience of the 
MyHammer management is that, in a number of cases, the interaction between craftsmen and 
consumers quickly goes offline. This explains the low consumer propensity to ultimately rate 
companies online.  
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Table 7: Negative binomial model, number of ratings as dependent variable 
Meister -0.43*** 
Employees 1-3 0.03 
Employees 4-9 0.04 
Employees 10-20 -0.79*** 
Employees 21+ 0.83 
GmbH (limited liability) 0.06 
UG (limited liability) 0.02 
GbR (full liability) -0.48*** 
Other -0.21 
Sector controls Yes 
Geographical controls  Yes 
Foundation year 0.01** 
Liability insurance  -0.16 
Employing a trainee 0.13 
Entry in 2010 0.30 
Entry in 2011 -0.12 
Entry in 2012 0.29 
Entry in 2013 -0.07 
Entry in 2014 -0.35 
Entry in 2015 -0.89 
Prob >chi2 0.00 
N 1,928 
*,**,*** correspond to 10, 5, and 1 percent levels of statistical significance. 
 
Our suspicion of selection effects seems to be corroborated by the data. Estimates for the 
“entry-year” variable show that in comparison to companies that entered in 2009, those that 
entered in the latest years (2014 and 2015) appear to achieve higher customer satisfaction. 
This is in accordance with the theory that with more experience using the platform, crafts 
companies will only choose to enter if they deem their services on par with customer 
expectations, as the self-selection hypothesis predicts. Furthermore, in line with the market 
selection hypothesis, companies with no ratings spend the lowest average time on 
MyHammer, followed by those with very low ratings (overall rating below 1.5). By contrast, 
companies with an above-average overall customer rating (>2.8) stay on MyHammer for an 
above-average length of time.  
Therefore, we complement our findings with results from a truncated regression model 
(which addresses the problem of self-selection) and a survival model (which addresses the 
problem of market selection).  
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4.2 Allowing for selection 
The results from the truncated regression model shown in table 8 are overall consistent with 
the findings in the previous models. With a lowest truncation limit of 1, the number of 
truncated observations is 24 for the regression with the overall rating as the dependent 
variable. It is 29 for the regression with the quality rating as the dependent variable. With 2 as 
the lower bound, 98 and 43 observations are truncated, whereas 83 quality ratings are 
truncated when 3 is our lower bound. In all cases, both the sign and the size of the estimates 
are similar to the linear cross-section estimates. Most importantly, qualification still has a 
positive and significant impact on ratings, with an effect size ranging from a 0.02 to 0.07 
higher average consumer rating.  
Table 8: Truncated regression model 
  Lower limit=1 Lower limit=2 
Lower 
limit=3 
  Overall rating Quality rating Overall rating Quality rating Quality rating 
Meister 0.03* 0.07** 0.02*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 
Employees 1-3 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02*** -0.03 -0.03* 
Employees 4-9 -0.05** -0.11** -0.04*** -0.07* -0.08*** 
Employees 10-20 -0.10 -0.18 -0.02 -0.13 -0.15** 
Employees 21+ -0.16 -0.42 0.01 -0.05 -0.11 
GmbH (limited liability) -0.02 -0.10 -0.00 -0.06 -0.02 
UG (limited liability) -0.15** -0.18 -0.15** -0.02 -0.06 
GbR (full liability) 0.02 -0.00 -0.04 -0.07 -0.00 
Other -0.09 -0.11 -0.07 -0.13 -0.12 
Sector controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geographical controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Foundation year -0.00 -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00** 
Liability insurance  -0.03* 0.02 0.02* 0.02 0.05** 
Employing a trainee 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 -0.09 -0.06 
Entry in 2010 0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 
Entry in 2011 0.03 -0.06 -0.01 -0.08 -0.06 
Entry in 2012 0.04 -0.05 -0.02 -0.09 -0.06 
Entry in 2013 0.03 -0.01 -0.00 -0.04 0.01 
Entry in 2014 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.04 
Entry in 2015 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.05 
Number of reviews -0.00 -0.00 0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** 
Prob >chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 1,904 1,852 1,830 1,902 1,800 
*,**,*** correspond to 10, 5, and 1 percent levels of statistical significance. 
   
36 
 
Turning to the survival analysis, there are visible threshold effects in the survival function 
with steep declines in survival rates after 90 and 455 days (see figure 3), meaning that many 
companies stay for this duration on the platform. This finding is explained by the type of 
contracts that MyHammer offers. The MyHammer starter packet – which lasts for three 
months – is meant as a test before a greater commitment to a longer duration contract. 
Thereafter, MyHammer offers one-year contracts. After one year and three months, the 
survival function takes a smoother shape.  
Figure 3: The survival function 
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Figure 4: The survival function by group 
 
The Kaplan-Meier function by group shows that qualification clearly matters for survival. As 
can be seen in figure 4, the survival estimate for companies with a Meister employed is 
noticeably above that of non-Meister companies and the statistical significance of this 
difference is confirmed through a Chi^2-test for the equality of survival functions between 
two groups. It appears that the advantage of having a Meister holds in particular for durations 
above approximately 90 days. We interpret this as further evidence in favor of the presence of 
a selection mechanism, since positive ratings for high quality take some time to accumulate 
and have an effect on the company’s wish to stay on the platform.  
The higher survival chance for Meister companies is corroborated by our parametric 
estimations shown in table 8. The margins estimates shown are the difference in median 
survival time with respect to the comparison group. We see that the median survival time for 
Meister companies is higher than that of non-Meister companies or – put differently – having 
a Meister significantly increases the chances of staying on the platform. The statistical 
significance of the results is similar across all models, both with and without frailty, although 
there is some variation in effect sizes. The estimated coefficients mainly range between 200 
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and 300 days.
12
 This means that being a Meister company on average across the models 
increases the median survival time on the platform by 256 days.  
As for the estimates of the control variables, they are mostly consistent with the results from 
the previous models. Employing more than ten employees decreases survival and companies 
with limited liability have lower survival spans than fully-liable companies. Finally, there is a 
significant positive effect of insurance on survival.  
5. Conclusion and policy implications 
Certifying professionals is an alternative to erecting market entry barriers in markets where 
information is incomplete. Empirical studies of professional voluntary certification schemes 
are scarce, although they are in theory an attractive means of reducing consumer search costs.  
In the German crafts sector, voluntary certification and occupational licensing have co-existed 
since 2004. Using data from an online platform for crafts services on which craftsmen and 
customers interact, we have found that in trades that are subject to a voluntary scheme, the 
presence of a person with a Meister certificate – i.e. a person with an advanced training 
degree – improves service quality as perceived by the consumer. This result is confirmed in a 
variety of empirical specifications.  
We argue that our findings show that the Meister certificate is a credible sign of quality for 
consumers which contribute to reducing search costs in the deregulated market segment. To 
this, it should be added that the Meister certificate is administered by the German Chamber of 
Crafts and Trades. This should also positively influence credibility as previous studies have 
shown that the source of information matters for the cost of acquiring it and that information 
provided by third parties (rather than directly by the producer) is generally more credible (see 
e.g. Ippolito and Mathios, 1990). 
The topic of search costs in the German crafts sector is by no means exhausted yet. Due to the 
nature of our data, we are unable to analyze whether the Meister certificate influences 
consumer behavior. Therefore, this important question is left to future research. Furthermore, 
quality most likely varies within the group of Meister companies as well as within the group 
of non-Meister companies. This, we do not address. Its impact on consumer search costs 
                                                          
12
 The companies in the sample stay between 88 and 2801 days on the platform. 
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could only be relieved through other mechanisms than the Meister certificate, such as 
reputation effects and online consumer rating portals.  
Nonetheless, our analysis marks an important starting point in terms of understanding search 
costs in the German crafts market and the insights gained are relevant for the policy 
discussions surrounding the common European market. National entry regulations such as 
occupational licensing stand in the way of labor mobility and market competition. Our 
findings should ease popular concerns about eroding consumer protection under voluntary 
certification and weaken the position of those who prefer and even lobby for more activist 
government approaches.  
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Table 9: Parametric estimation results 
 
Gamma distribution  Inverted Gaussian distribution  No frailty 
  Exponential Weibull Gompertz Exponential Weibull Gompertz Exponential Weibull Gompertz 
Meister 273.66** 270.10* 105.05 279.25** 244.55* 171.55* 247.50** 272.04** 292.02** 
Employees 1-3 91.41 94.90 53.86 92.87 80.30 55.87 61.24 73.33 78.90 
Employees 4-9 75.89 76.65 68.03 79.78 83.95 59.04 48.44 61.22 65.27 
Employees 10-20 -1006.15*** -1000.10*** -481.70** -1016.30*** -956.30*** -700.63*** -914.01*** -978.63*** -1048.30*** 
Employees 21+ -851.53 -839.50 -334.12 -852.19 -788.40 -574.88 -811.91* -849.77 -913.05 
GmbH (limited liability) -86.67 -94.90 -98.86 -85.96 -80.30 -66.53 -54.50 -59.07 -65.10 
UG (limited liability) -917.78** -876.00** -266.02 -940.84** -952.65*** -634.90** -956.34*** -1013.03*** -1089.08*** 
GbR (full liability) -455.87 -463.55* -274.81 -462.27* -427.05* -324.53* -370.13* -408.67* -436.16 
Other -290.32 -270.10 -89.83 -315.48 -335.80 -229.11 -301.21 -336.54 -356.04 
Liability insurance 1022.94*** 1058.50*** 931.38 1017.08*** 890.60*** 786.07*** 864.03*** 891.39*** 954.71*** 
Employing a trainee 1524.89*** 1540.30*** 1032.95*** 1557.60 1529.35*** 1151.41*** 1302.79*** 1416.28*** 1518.50*** 
Foundation year 5.05 7.30 5.92 4.97 3,65 3.23 1.52 2.27 2.46 
Geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prob>chi^2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 3,483 3,483 3,483 3,483 3,483 3,483 3,483 3,483 3,483 
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Chapter III: Does occupational licensing 
really impact incomes? - The German 
crafts case  
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Abstract 
The empirical literature on occupational licensing finds standard monopoly effects of entry 
regulations: Less competition and economic rents for professionals. I exploit the natural 
experimental design of a change in the German crafts regulation in 2004, which removed the 
traditional licensing requirement only for certain trades, and find no robust effects. I point out 
that the existing studies on the income effects of occupational licensing suffer from 
methodological weaknesses. Most studies rely on cross-section estimates that are likely to be 
biased due to unobserved heterogeneity whereas others do not rigorously define the 
population of interest. Based on my results, I suggest that demand-effects and market 
saturation have so far been inadequately discussed in the literature.  
JEL Classification: I28, I39, J24, L51  
Keywords: Labor markets, occupational licensing, monopoly rent, natural experiment, 
craftsmanship 
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1. Introduction 
Why do some occupations pay more than others? Occupational licensing (i.e. requiring 
minimum levels of human capital investment by professionals) is the strictest form of 
regulation to access professions that blocks market access for individuals without the 
necessary credentials. A large body of literature has found that the subsequent reduction in 
labor supply generates an income premium for market incumbents (see e.g. Friedman and 
Kuznets, 1954; and Kleiner and Krueger, 2010). This again is an incentive to lobby for 
perpetuating licensing requirements at ever-increasing standards (see Rottenberg, 1962).  
National occupational licensing schemes have been steadily on the rise since the Second 
World War, in both Europe and the US (see Kleiner, 2006; and Kleiner and Kueger, 2010) 
replacing in part the decline in labor union membership. This development is at odds with 
European institutions’ efforts to create a common market area with comparable regulatory 
frameworks to enable and foster the free movement of labor between countries (see COM, 
2013) since costly investment in national specific qualifications precludes cross-country 
worker mobility.  
In line with those efforts and in order to increase market competition by facilitating entry, the 
German regulator – contrary to the trend observed by Kleiner and colleagues – in 2004 
liberalized the traditional occupation licensing scheme in the crafts sector. Since then, 
craftsmen in a number of crafts trades are no longer required to hold the traditional Meister 
title (an advanced vocational training certificate) to found a company to facilitate and foster 
entrepreneurship in craft trades.  
Free market skepticism motivated by fear of earning erosion due to low-cost entrants may 
hinder the process of European integration. Both the EU enlargements of 2004-2013, the 
Commission’s plans of integrating further eastern European states in the common market as 
well as the continuous extra-European immigration may spark such reservations. As a result, 
member states and national interest groups could be tempted to demand (and obtain) 
protective measures, which are thought to avoid a decrease of earnings in groups particularly 
affected by low-cost competition. An informed policy debate on how measures such as 
occupational licensing (and its suspension) actually affect incomes is therefore worth striving 
for.  
In recent years, a number of studies have used the 2004 reform for this exact purpose. They 
have found significant negative income effects of removing occupational licensing in the 
46 
 
crafts, which may fuel the popular concerns noted above (see Bol, 2014; Bol and Weeden, 
2014; Damelang et al., 2017; and Lergetporer et al., 2016). I re-examine the effects of this 
deregulation and contrary to the existing literature, I find no convincing evidence of reduced 
incomes. In the explanation of these results, I go beyond the common focus on reduced price 
competition and thus the appearance of economic rent and propose alternative mechanisms 
whereby occupational licensing and incomes interact that also include the demand-side. I 
conclude that in light of my findings viewing occupational licensing as an “active labor 
market policy” to safeguard living standards is not only be harmful to the common market, 
but it may also not have the desired effect or – at best – it might affect incomes at random.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter two is a critical review of the 
related literature, before chapter three describes the data used for the empirical analysis. 
Chapter four details the methodology used, while chapter five summarizes the results. Finally, 
chapter six provides possible explanations for the findings, whereas chapter seven concludes.  
2. Related literature  
Human capital models in which individual rewards are a function of education and skills have 
been supplemented with contributions stressing the role of government regulation to explain 
income differences. Licensing schemes – which require minimum levels of human capital 
investment by professionals and as such constitute a market entry barrier – have received 
particular attention in the literature.  
Several theoretical contributions (see e.g. Stigler, 1971; and Friedman and Kuznets, 1954) 
expect a positive link between occupational licensing and incomes, which empirical studies 
(see e.g. Kleiner and Kudrle, 2000; and Kleiner and Krueger, 2010) – mainly using US data – 
have confirmed. Recently, several empirical studies concerning licensing and incomes have 
been conducted using the example of the German crafts sector, reaffirming this positive 
relationship (see Bol, 2014; Bol and Weeden, 2014; Damelang et al., 2017; and Lergetporer et 
al., 2016). However, the studies are subject to various methodological and interpretational 
issues.  
Most empirical studies on the effects of occupational licensing use a cross-section study 
design. Some studies of the German crafts sector also use this methodology and find very 
strong and significant effects on incomes; for instance, Bol (2014) explores survey data for 
2006 and finds that self-employed craftsmen subject to occupational licensing receive 13% 
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higher income. However, in most cases, being subject to occupational licensing is not random, 
meaning that effect estimates will be biased unless all other factors influencing individual 
income are controlled for. It is difficult to perfectly control for individual human-level 
characteristics and differences in occupation-level productivity. The estimates of income 
differences between licensed und unlicensed professions are therefore likely to be biased due 
to this unobserved heterogeneity.  
The German craft sector however actually presents researchers with a golden opportunity to 
improve on the cross-section design when examining the effects of occupational licensing, 
since the scheme was recently reformed in a way that resembles a natural experiment. The 
German craft sector is regulated by the so-called Trade and Crafts Code (Handwerksordnung) 
and comprises about 5 million professionals in 93 trades
13
, which make up about 12% of the 
working population (Federal Statistical Office, 2016). From 1953 to 2004, all German craft 
trades were subject to a licensing scheme. Only craftsmen with a Meister title (internationally 
recognized as tertiary education) could found a company. Since 2004, market entry in certain 
trades
14
 has been open, although craftsmen in these trades can still choose to acquire the 
Meister title. In the remaining trades, the licensing requirement remains fully
15
 or partially
16
 
intact.
17
  
Since the reform only affected certain craftsmen, it is in theory possible to assess the casual 
effect of removing occupational licensing using difference-in-differences estimation, which 
some studies have already done. This has the great advantage of eliminating the unobserved 
heterogeneity bias given certain key assumptions. With this approach, Damelang et al. (2017) 
find an average treatment effect of minus 13 euros per month in the deregulated trades. 
Lergetporer et al. (2016) find a significant negative reform effect on the incomes of employed 
craftsmen of 0.7% on average each year since the reform, with effect sizes only setting in 5 
years after the deregulation. Using a second dataset and looking at total household incomes, 
they find stronger effect sizes (-8% to -12%), with employed craftsmen being more affected 
by the reform compared with self-employed craftsmen.  
                                                          
13
 The term “trade” pertains directly to the craft sector, whereas the term “occupation” is more general since a 
given occupation can contain both craft and non-crafts workers, as well as different craft trades. When referring 
to the German context, I will use the term “trade” to remain true to the German regulation. However, for insights 
on regulation, I will use the term “occupation” to align with the relevant literature. 
14
 Examples of fully deregulated trades are tiles and mosaic layers, coppersmiths and tailors. 
15
 Examples of fully regulated trades are roofers, gunsmiths and plumbers. 
16
 Examples of partially regulated trades are optometrists, orthopedic and dental technicians. 
17
 It was the political intention that both occupations considered hazardousness and/or providing a significant 
contribution vocational training in Germany should remain regulated. The minutes of the negotiations do 
however also provide evidence for interest group lobbying (see Bundestag, 2011; Bulla, 2012). 
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While the authors of these papers conclude that workers in deregulated occupations have been 
affected negatively by the policy reform, it is worth highlighting the small effect sizes. Also, 
it is not clear that the observed income reduction from 2009 can actually be attributed to the 
policy change in 2004. Lergetporer et al. (2016) themselves note that they are planning future 
work which also includes more recent years in order to see beyond the financial crisis. It is 
also not clear why the authors use household income to investigate the effects of a reform that 
affects individual incomes. Again, Lergetporer et al. (2016) themselves point out that in this 
case, intra-household adjustments may bias results.  
Furthermore, while the unbiasedness of the difference-in-difference estimator does not require 
controlling for every difference (apart from the treatment itself) in the treatment and 
comparison groups, it does require that in the absence of treatment, the unobserved 
differences between treatment and comparison groups are the same over time. Since it is not 
possible for an individual to be simultaneously treated and non-treated, the identifying 
assumption of the same trend in the absence of treatment cannot be tested. However, 
researchers can examine whether the assumption of a common trend appears justified in the 
pre-treatment period. This aspect is not investigated by Damelang et al. (2017), while 
Lergetporer et al (2016) conclude that the common trends assumption holds after some 
procedure of observation matching (by which most of the effect size disappears).  
Additionally, the allocation of observations into regulated and deregulated craft trades is 
problematic. The considered datasets often do not contain explicit information about craft 
membership, which thus must be defined from the occupation variable. However, the line 
between craft and industry activity in the occupation classification, which does not reflect the 
legal definition of the crafts, is blurred. This opens up room for discretion. To illustrate this 
Runst et al. (2016, p. 4) conduct a thorough re-examination of the crafts classification in 
Rostam-Afschar (2014) and find that: “the demarcation chosen […] is most probably too 
broad: While it certainly includes many of the occupations that German craftsmen would 
practice, it also very likely contains a large proportion of non-crafts individuals who are 
unaffected by the policy reform”. 
Finally, in the interpretation of the results, the existing literature fails to recognize that there 
may be other channels besides economic rents linking occupational licensing and incomes. 
Also, since the average qualification level of craftsmen may have been affected by the reform, 
any income reduction may also just be a result of lower productivity. 
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In this study, I again exploit the natural experiment provided by the German craft sector to 
shed light on the link between occupational licensing and incomes using difference-in-
differences estimation. I contribute to the existing literature by addressing the aforementioned 
problems of previous studies.  
3. Descriptive data analysis 
3.1 Dataset 
I use the microcensus dataset for 2000-2010, which is a representative official sample survey 
of the German population.
18
 This dataset has many attractive features for economic 
researchers: one percent of the German population (approximately 800 000 individuals) are 
sampled, a broad range of economic and socio-demographic variables are covered, the data 
collection is executed by statistical officials through personal interviews and a response is 
compulsory for most questions. The last two features contribute to a very low unit non-
response rate of 3%.  
The usual problems with data collection for income studies still hold for the microcensus. 
Notably, the very top or the very bottom of the distribution has a smaller chance of being 
included in income surveys and well-off individuals have incentives to under-report their 
income (see Hoeller et al., 2012). Nevertheless, the personal character of the data collection 
should limit these biases in the case of the microcensus. Furthermore, the extremes of the 
income distribution are probably less relevant when studying the craft sector.  
Furthermore, individual income in the microcensus is reported in 24 intervals and hence not 
as specific as could be wished. In order to achieve a metric scale for the variable, I use a 
method described by the Leibniz Institute for Social Sciences
19
 where I assign the mid-point 
of the respective income interval for each observation. For the unbounded first and last 
interval, I assign 1.5 times the interval’s lower bound and 0.75 times the upper bound, 
respectively. The more incomes are normally distributed within the intervals, the more 
accurate that this transformation will be. Although this feature of the microcensus might 
prevent picking up small changes in individual incomes over time, it also prevents 
                                                          
18
 For detailed information about the microcensus, see e.g.: N. Schwarz (2001).  
19
 In: GESIS (Hg.): Mikrodaten-Informationssystem MISSY. URL: 
http://www.gesis.org/missy/files/documents/MZ/Auswertungsbeispiel_BerechnungDes%C3%84quivalenzeinko
mmens.pdf (downloaded am 24.07.2017) 
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overemphasizing effects of very little economic consequence (see my previous critique of 
Damelang, 2017).  
If one is to assess the implications of a particular policy change in the crafts sector, it is 
paramount that especially the treatment group only comprises individuals within this sector. 
Like most other datasets, the microcensus does not contain a separate crafts variable, which is 
a potential pitfall for researchers unfamiliar with the specific legal definition of the German 
craft sector. Several occupations cover both craft and industry activities, hence solely relying 
on this variable, which all published studies on the effect of the deregulation on incomes to 
date do, is unlikely to capture the true population of interest. Runst et al. (forthcoming) show 
that by using solely the occupation variable to identify the population of interest will lead to 
including non-craftsmen as well, in particular in the treatment group.  
I use the method proposed in Runst et al. (forthcoming) for identifying the crafts, which 
combines the occupation codes in the microcensus with data from the Federal Institute for 
Vocational Education and Training on the share of crafts apprentices within each occupational 
code. Only occupations where this share exceeds 60% are considered as crafts here, which is 
an effective procedure for deriving a clean definition for the microcensus data, which 
excludes individuals in the agricultural or industrial or service sectors of the economy, which 
are unaffected by changes in crafts legislation.
20
  
I restrict my analysis to the self-employed, in line with most studies on the income effects of 
the reform when self-employment can be identified in the data. Before as well as after the 
reform, craftsmen could seek employment regardless of their professional degree in all trades. 
The traditional licensing requirement concerns only craftsmen founding a company. It has 
however been argued that employees may have been affected by the reform through intra-firm 
bargaining effects (see notably Damelang et al., 2017). In theory, it is even imaginable that 
through such mechanisms self-employed are left fully unaffected by removing occupational 
licensing. In order to make sure that all theoretical effects of the reform are accounted for, I 
estimate an alternative specification (not presented in the paper) where the population of 
interest also include all employees in the German crafts sector. The findings do not change; 
hence I conclude that restricting the analysis to the self-employed is appropriate.  
                                                          
20
 The classification scheme in the microcensus (KldB1992) merges about about seven activity profiles related to 
cleaning into one code (934). According to the crafts classification scheme recently developed by the Federal 
Employment Agency (BAA, 2014 ), only three of these seven occupations belong to the crafts sector. As in 
Runst et al. (forthcoming), I therefore do not include cleaners in the analysis. 
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Also, I distinguish between men and women as well as between part- and full-time workers as 
labor market studies tend to focus on homogeneous groups with respect to labor market 
participation (see e.g. Becker and Blossfeld, 2017). 
The dataset only contains information on total net income and therefore no information on 
labor income. This is unfortunate since the reform would have only affected labor income and 
using total income will likely understate the reduction in income after the reform as public 
transfers will partly compensate for the reduction. Another reason to regret the absence of an 
earnings variable is that unobserved factors influencing other income sources may bias the 
results if they affect craft trades differently. Therefore, I only include in the sample 
respondents who reported that labor earnings are the primary source of their net individual 
income. Furthermore, I exclude monthly net incomes below 300 Euros (which are likely only 
noise) from the full-time working sample. 
Finally, the total sample comprises 30,691 observations, of which 17% work in a fully 
deregulated trade. According to official German craft statistics (“Handwerkszählung”), my 
sample make up 7% of the total German craft population where the share of workers in a 
deregulated trade amounts to 20%. Table 1 provides a descriptive summary of the sample in 
this study. 
  
52 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables by treatment and control group 
 
 
Treatment group Control group 
  mean St.d. mean St.d. 
Individual net total income 1858.93 1608.98 2112.85 1925.82 
Age 45 10 45 10 
Female 0.23 0.42 0.13 0.34 
Migrant 0.10 0.31 0.06 0.23 
Hours worked 47 14 51 14 
Part-time 0.10 0.30 0.04 0.19 
Time-in-current-job 12 10 12 10 
Number of employees  4 15 5 14 
Last labor market status     
    Unemployed 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.10 
  Employed 0.71 0.46 0.71 0.46 
  Student 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.04 
  Other 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.07 
Marital status      
    Single 0.25 0.43 0.20 0.40 
  Married 0.64 0.48 0.71 0.45 
  Widow(er) 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.11 
  Divorced 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27 
Number of children     
    None 0.63 0.48 0.58 0.49 
  One child 0.18 0.39 0.20 0.40 
  Two children 0.15 0.36 0.17 0.38 
  Three+ children 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.22 
General education     
    Lower secondary school 0.51 0.50 0.62 0.49 
  Intermediate secondary school 0.25 0.44 0.26 0.44 
  University entrance qualification 0.23 0.42 0.12 0.32 
Vocational qualification     
    None 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.13 
  Vocational training 0.89 0.31 0.96 0.19 
  Advanced vocational training 0.08 0.27 0.02 0.15 
  University  0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 
N (max-min) 5819-5235 27079-25456 
Source: Microcensus 2000-2010 
3.2 Incomes in the German crafts sector 
Over the period considered, the average craftsman in Germany received 2066 euros net per 
month. As figure 1 clearly shows, for all of the sub-population considered and across the 
entire time span considered, craftsmen in deregulated trades have on average lower incomes 
than those working in the still regulated trades.  
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Furthermore, a visual interpretation of figure 1 may suggest that deregulated occupations have 
been more strongly affected by certain developments around the time of the 2004 reform than 
trades subject to occupational licensing for the full-time sample and the male sample. No such 
effect can be observed for the female- and part-time sample. 
However, this provides no conclusive evidence on a possible reform effect for the sub-groups 
concerned, in particular since incomes among men and full-time workers were already on a 
downward-sloping trend as the reform took place in both deregulated- and still regulated 
trades. Furthermore, one would have expected the effects of such a reform to be long-lasting 
however incomes in the deregulated sector pick up after 2005 and follow the same up-ward 
sloping trend as income in the still-regulated sector. 
Another important insight from figure 1 relates to the years before the reform (2000-2004). As 
previously underlined, the treatment and control groups must follow identical trends in 
absence of the policy intervention for the treatment effect to be identifiable, although it is 
unclear whether this is the case here. For the male- and full-time samples, while the general 
evolution pre-treatment appears similar, the rise in incomes at the onset of the 2000s appeared 
earlier in the regulated trades. For the female- and part-time sample, it seems even more 
questionable that the parallel trends assumption holds. The rest of the paper is dedicated to 
investigating these intuitions using regression analysis.  
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Figure 1: Evolution of incomes of self-employed (male, female, full-time and part-time) in the 
treatment- and control group  
 
Source: Microcensus 2000-2010. 
4. Empirical approach 
4.1 Estimation 
By using difference-in-differences (DID), researchers can benefit from the quasi-experimental 
research design of economic reforms that only affect certain groups. The average treatment 
effect of the treated is then calculated by comparing the average change over time in the 
outcome variable for the treatment group with the average change over time for the control 
group. 
This methodological approach has been chosen in several existing studies on the effects of the 
reform in 2004 on market entry and exit effects and it is the approach that I favor to examine 
the income effects of the German crafts reform. I therefore estimate the following regression: 
[1] Yit=β1+β2(treati)+β3(timet)+ρ(treati⋅timet)+Ɣ(X vector of controls)+ϵit  
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of monthly individual income. The treatment 
group is the fully deregulated B-trades. Trades that are still fully or partially subject to 
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occupational licensing form the control group. The reform effect is the interaction term 
between the treatment groups and time after 2004. Years after 2004 are chosen since 
microcensus data is collected in April every year and it is unlikely that any income effects of 
the reform – which entered into force on January 1, 2004 – would have manifested during the 
first quarter of is year.  
A concern in difference-in-differences analysis is that the policy may have been anticipated 
by the concerned individuals and as a consequence, they would have adjusted their behavior 
in the pre-treatment years. If the researcher is not aware of this, the estimation will not pick up 
existing treatment effects. Anticipation effects are very unlikely in the case of the German 
crafts deregulation. Very long there was great discussion and uncertainties regarding which 
crafts trades were to be deregulated. The governing coalition presented a reform proposal in in 
2003 which it was criticized and rejected by the Federal Assembly, the upper house of the 
German parliament and as a result the final discussion in the mediation committee occurred 
on December 10 in 2003 after which many of the trades intended for deregulation would 
remain regulated or would be only partially deregulated (Runst, 2018). Still, to be on the safe 
side, I estimate an alternative specification (not presented in the paper) where 2004 is defined 
as the treatment year. The findings do not change, hence I deduce that choosing 2005 as the 
treatment year is not erroneous.  
The vector of control variables includes general individual attributes, namely age, age 
squared, gender, having a migration background, state and city size. It also includes human 
capital measures of the highest obtained general education and vocational qualification.
21
 I 
also control for a number of labor market attributes, namely working hours, the number of 
years spent in the current position, company size, occupation, previous labor market status as 
well as previous occupation. In addition, household characteristics are included, namely 
marital status and the number of children.  
The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity rejects the null-hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity. Therefore, I calculate robust standard errors allowing for intra-group 
correlation between different occupations.  
Average effects may hide interesting developments for particular sub-populations. The 
construction sector may be a special case, in particular with respect to the impact of the 
                                                          
21
 The German terms regarding education/degree have been translated using a guide from the Federal Institute 
for Vocational Education and Training according to G. Batzel, ‘Berufsbildungsbegriffe Deutsch-Englisch 
Terminologiesammlung für Berufsbildungsfachleute’ (2017) Berufsinstitut für Berufsbildung, Bonn. 
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business cycle. Therefore, I run two separate regressions: one including only construction 
occupations and one excluding all construction occupations. I also look more closely at the 
floor-tiling occupation due to its non-negligible size (20% of all construction craftsmen). 
Lastly, I look at a sample consisting only of Meister-companies, as means of looking at the 
effects of the reform on market incumbents. The existing literature on this reform that 
investigates heterogeneous effects mostly find significant income reductions only for male 
crafts (see Lergetporer et al., 2016). Hence, these regressions focus on the full-time male 
craftsmen sample. 
I also estimate one specification with yearly interaction terms, which is able to pick up lagged 
effects as it is possible to consider a situation where reform effects take time to materialize. 
For instance, Lergetporer et al. (2016) find that significant income effects of the 2004 reform 
only appear with a five year lag.  
The DID approach is only valid as long as unobserved factors are constant over time or 
change in a similar way for the treatment and control groups. Therefore, as is standard for 
DID analyses, I test the likelihood of common trends through a placebo test regression, where 
I exclude all observations in the post-reform period and simulate a treatment in the years 
preceding the reform.  
I also estimate the baseline regression with an alternative control group. One obvious choice 
here is individuals outside the crafts sector. Additionally, I estimate the baseline DID 
regression with the fully deregulated trades as well as and partially deregulated trades as 
treatment groups and only the still fully regulated trades as the control group. Despite still 
being subject to occupational licensing, some trades were nevertheless affected by the reform 
in 2004 as subsequently experienced employees without a Meister title in these trades have 
been permitted to start a business. Moreover, a potential business owner without a sufficient 
degree was enabled to hire a company manager who possesses a Meister degree to start the 
business.  
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5. Results 
5.1 Main findings 
Contrary to previous studies, I find no immediate indication of a negative effect on incomes 
for male craftsmen as a result of the deregulation in 2004. Surprisingly, a rather sizeable 
positive income effect for female craftsmen emerges, which is significant at the 10% level 
(see table 2, column 1 and 3). The adjusted R
2
 is only 0.22, although a relatively low 
coefficient of determination is not uncommon in social sciences and does not exclude that the 
estimation yields relevant results (see Wooldridge, 2002). 
Table 2: Main results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Men full-time     Men part-time   Women full-time  Women part-time  
Reformeffect -0.0071 0.42    0.096* 0.032    
Deregulated trade -0.13*** -0.18    -0.41*** -0.048    
Post 2004 0.12*** -0.18    0.15*** 0.051    
Age 0.027*** -0.015    0.039*** -0.025    
Age square -0.00032*** 0.00019    -0.00050*** 0.00027    
Migrant -0.071*** -0.019    -0.070 -0.0091    
Time-in-current-job 0.0069*** 0.012*   0.0084*** 0.0065*** 
Number of employees  0.045*** 0.028    0.0031** 0.0020  
Last labor market status       
   Unemployed Comparison Comparison Comparison Comparison 
  Employed 0.088*** -0.16    0.18*** 0.16    
  Student -0.18*** -0.19    -0.20 0.31*   
  Other 0.0029 -0.21    0.21 -0.20*   
Marital status        
   Single Comparison Comparison Comparison Comparison 
  Married 0.12*** -0.058    -0.016 -0.23*** 
  Widow(er) 0.048 0.13    0.21*** 0.24    
  Divorced 0.038* -0.11    0.11*** 0.045    
Number of children       
   None Comparison Comparison Comparison Comparison 
  One child 0.048*** 0.078    -0.026 -0.043    
  Two children 0.11*** -0.26*   -0.041 0.0034    
  Three+ children 0.13*** -0.17    0.13 0.14*   
General education       
   Lower secondary school Comparison Comparison Comparison Comparison 
  Intermediate secondary school 0.063*** 0.34*** 0.058*** 0.084    
  University entrance qualification 0.0061 0.076    0.050 0.24*   
Vocational qualification       
   None Comparison Comparison Comparison Comparison 
  Vocational training 0.010 0.27**  -0.064 0.36*** 
  Advanced vocational training 0.028 0.39**  -0.030 0.32*** 
  University  0.090** 0.29    0.057 0.27    
  0.25 0.34    0.23 0.31    
N 17807 452 2506 547 
Source: Microcensus 2000-2010. 
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When looking more specifically at different sub-groups of the male, full-time working crafts 
population, it becomes apparent that distinguishing between construction and non-
construction occupations is important (see table 3, column 1 and 2). The deregulation appears 
to have reduced incomes by 6% in the construction crafts, a result which has high statistical 
significance. Symmetrically, when construction trades are excluded, there is no income 
impact of the deregulation for male full-time workers. Excluding the occupation ‘floor tilers’ 
changes nothing from the baseline results (see table 3, column 3).  
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that in the sample consisting only of Meister-companies, 
the reform-effect is far from significant (see table 3, column 4). This implies that those 
companies in the previously regulated market overall have not seen their income drop as a 
result of the deregulation. This speaks against the predominant view of economic rents in the 
licensed occupations and favors the explanation that any drop in incomes is a result of 
changes in the average human capital of supply. 
Table 3: Results by sub-group 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Only construction 
sector 
Excluding 
construction sector 
Excluding tilers 
Only Meister 
craftsmen 
Reformeffect -0.058*** 0.036    0.010 0.0089    
Deregulated trade 0.088*** -0.067**  -0.14*** -0.19*** 
Post 2004 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
Age 0.033*** 0.020*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 
Age square -0.00040*** -0.00026*** -0.00033*** -0.00030*** 
Migrant -0.064** -0.12*** -0.065*** -0.032    
Time-in-current-job 0.0088*** 0.0067*** 0.0069*** 0.0056*** 
Number of employees  0.045*** N/A 0.046*** 0.049*** 
Last labor market status     
 
  
  Unemployed Comparison Comparison Comparison Comparison 
  Employed 0.053* 0.21**  0.086** 0.13**  
  Student -0.27*** -0.15*   -0.18*** -0.11    
  Other -0.031 0.17    0.0036 -0.11    
Marital status      
 
  
  Single Comparison Comparison Comparison Comparison 
  Married 0.10*** 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 
  Widow(er) 0.11 -0.0076    0.021 0.030    
  Divorced 0.045* 0.044    0.034 0.042*   
Number of children     
 
  
  None Comparison Comparison Comparison Comparison 
  One child 0.042** 0.055**  0.048*** 0.046*** 
  Two children 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.092*** 
  Three+ children 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 
General education     
 
  
  Lower secondary school Comparison Comparison Comparison Comparison 
  Intermediate secondary school 0.086*** 0.073*** 0.065*** 0.056*** 
  University entrance qualification 0.013 0.050* 0.0069 0.033*   
Vocational qualification     
 
  
  None Comparison Comparison Comparison Comparison 
  Vocational training 0.0012 0.0074    0.0075 N/A 
  Advanced vocational training 0.0079 0.076**  0.021 N/A 
  University  0.079 0.10*   0.087** N/A 
  0.25 0.22    0.25 0.25    
N 10624 8709 17052 10379 
Source: Microcensus 2000-2010.   
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Turning to the control variables, they mostly have the expected significance and sign. The 
estimate for working in one of the deregulated trades is mostly negative and highly significant 
and the estimate size almost identical to the existing literature (-10% in column 1, table 2 and 
-12% in Bol, 2014).  
This is the same finding that Bol (2014) uses to argue the existence of economic rents as a 
result of licensing in the German crafts sector. However, due to the likely presence of 
unobserved heterogeneity between trades, these estimates should certainly not be interpreted 
as a reform effect, nor is it a perfect causal effect of working in a deregulated trade. One 
important source of heterogeneity is human capital differences, which are inherently very 
difficult to measure. Beyond individual differences, another important source of heterogeneity 
is differences in productivity between firms, for which there are no variables in the 
microcensus dataset.  
In full-time samples, age and migrant status both influence earnings, as could be expected 
from the economic literature. Incomes rise for each additional year of age, whereas migrants 
face an income penalty. Unsurprisingly, the number of hours worked significantly increases 
income, as does an additional year spent in the current position. 
Household composition also matters for the income, although men and women are somewhat 
differently affected, not surprisingly. Full-time males as these craftsmen with children have 
significantly higher incomes than their childless counterparts. This result could in theory be 
explained by both the public subsidies given to families (as the income variable is net income 
and not labor income) as well as previous findings in the literature suggesting that high 
earners are more likely to find a mate (implying reverse causality). Given that this effect can 
only be found for males and not for the female sample and that for that same sample being 
married has a significant positive effect on incomes, the latter explanation seems most 
probable. However, the former could be behind the significant effect of having more than 
three children on the incomes of part-time working women.  
The human capital variables have the expected sign and are sometimes significant. The effect 
of the intermediate secondary school degree (Realschule) is the most robust, which is also the 
most prevalent general education among individuals starting a vocational education in the 
German crafts.
22
 The effect of the Meister-qualification itself in terms of qualification, the 
                                                          
22
 Among individuals being educated in the crafts in 2005, 40% had a so-called ‘Realschulabschluss’, the 
intermediate school form in the German educational system, see Mueller (2017). 
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effect of having completed advanced vocational education – which includes Meister 
craftsmen – is surprisingly not significant.  
5.2 Validity 
The specifications with alternative control groups corroborate the findings above. No 
significant income effects for male craftsmen are detected regardless of whether non-
craftsmen form the control group or if the partially deregulated trades are switched from the 
control group to the treatment group (see table 4, coloumn 1 and 2). A significant positive 
income effect for women is found using both alternative control specifications (see table 4, 
column 3 and 4). The effect size when only fully deregulated trades form the control group is 
particularly strong. It should, however, be noted that the number of fully deregulated trades is 
very small, meaning that this specification should be interpreted with caution. 
Table 4: Results using alternative control groups 
 
Men full-time Women full-time 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Non-craft  
Only fully regul.  
Non-craft  
Only fully 
regul.  
Reformeffect full deregulation -0.017 -0.00046    0.085**  0.28*** 
Reformeffect partial deregulation N/A 0.01 N/A 0.19*** 
Fully deregulated -0.034** -0.24*** -0.048**  -0.83*** 
Partial deregulated N/A -0.11*** N/A -0.39*** 
Post 2004 0.11*** 0.12*   0.090*** -0.025    
Age 0.020*** 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.035*** 
Age square -0.00021*** -0.00029*** -0.00031*** -0.00045*** 
Migrant -0.060*** -0.062*** -0.040**  -0.082*   
Time-in-current-job 0.0094*** 0.0067*** 0.0098*** 0.0080*** 
Number of employees  0.045*** 0.043*** 0.039*** 0.043*** 
Last labor market status   
 
  
   Unemployed Comparison Comparison Comparison Comparison 
  Employed 0.24*** 0.076**  0.17*** 0.17*** 
  Student -0.022 -0.19*** -0.097*   -0.23    
  Other 0.16*** -0.0065    -0.0017    0.21*   
Marital status    
 
  
 
  Single Comparison Comparison Comparison Comparison 
  Married 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.020    -0.0053    
  Widow(er) 0.073** 0.045    0.12*** 0.22*** 
  Divorced 0.048*** 0.033    0.067*** 0.11*** 
Number of children   
 
  
   None Comparison Comparison Comparison Comparison 
  One child 0.042*** 0.049*** 0.022    -0.013    
  Two children 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.044*** -0.028    
  Three+ children 0.18*** 0.13*** 0.090*** 0.13    
General education   
 
  
   Lower secondary school Comparison Comparison Comparison Comparison 
  Intermediate secondary school 0.11*** 0.058*** 0.14*** 0.059*** 
  University entrance qualification 0.14*** 0.00029    0.14*** 0.050    
Vocational qualification   
 
  
   None Comparison Comparison Comparison Comparison 
  Vocational training 0.067*** 0.017    -0.031*   -0.038    
  Advanced vocational training 0.087*** 0.025    -0.021    -0.014    
  University  0.16*** 0.094**  0.070*** 0.071    
  0.35 0.26    0.33 0.26    
N 74968 17807 26941 17807 
Source: Microcensus 2000-2010.  
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Looking at lagged effects over a period of three years does not yield any new substance to the 
interpretation (see table 5). I would also caution against putting much weight on the 
interpretation of lagged effects as Lergetporer et al. (2016) do, since the more the analysis 
moves away from the reform implementation in time, the more one should be concerned that 
estimates may be picking up irrelevant developments affecting the outcome variable. 
Table 5: Results with yearly interaction terms 
 
Men full-time Women full-time 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  
Yearly 
interaction 
terms all 
sectors 
Yearly 
interaction 
terms only 
construction 
Yearly 
interaction terms 
all sectors 
Reformeffect 2000      
Reformeffect 2001 0.025 0.084*** -0.16** 
Reformeffect 2002 0.0094 0.022    -0.10 
Reformeffect 2003 0.039 0.073*   0.05 
Reformeffect 2004 0.027 0.032    -0.07 
Reformeffect 2005 0.011 -0.0051    0.09 
Reformeffect 2006 0.011 -0.016    0.05 
Reformeffect 2007 0.049 0.020    0.02 
Reformeffect 2008 -0.023 -0.074*** 0.05 
Reformeffect 2009 N/A N/A N/A 
Reformeffect 2010 N/A N/A N/A 
Deregulated trade -0.16*** 0.052**  -0.39*** 
Age 0.024*** 0.031*** 0.035*** 
Age square -0.00029*** -0.00037*** -0.00045*** 
Migrant -0.062*** -0.051*   -0.078*** 
Time-in-current-job 0.0066*** 0.0084*** 0.0080*** 
Number of employees  0.043*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 
Last labor market status      
  Unemployed Comparison Comparison Comparison 
  Employed 0.076** 0.041    0.18*** 
  Student -0.19*** -0.27*** -0.22 
  Other -0.0049 -0.032    0.20* 
Marital status       
  Single Comparison Comparison Comparison 
  Married 0.11*** 0.094*** -0.0090 
  Widow(er) 0.045 0.11    0.21*** 
  Divorced 0.034* 0.040    0.12*** 
Number of children      
  None Comparison Comparison Comparison 
  One child 0.049*** 0.043**  -0.014 
  Two children 0.11*** 0.10*** -0.029 
  Three+ children 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.14 
General education      
  Lower secondary school Comparison Comparison Comparison 
  Intermediate secondary school 0.058*** 0.062*** 0.059*** 
  University entrance qualification 0.00036 -0.010    0.045 
Vocational qualification      
  None Comparison Comparison Comparison 
  Vocational training 0.017 0.011    -0.044 
  Advanced vocational training 0.024 0.0058    -0.019 
  University  0.093** 0.085    0.075 
  0.26 0.26    0.24 
N 17807 10624 2506 
Source: Microcensus 2000-2010. 
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The placebo test lends further credibility to the absence of income effects for male craftsmen. 
Simulated policy changes before 2004 all have insignificant effects on income (see column 1, 
table 6). The same procedure mostly holds for construction crafts trades, but fails in 2001, 
where a significant placebo-reform is found (see column 2, table 6). Hence, the significant 
negative income-effect found in the construction sector should be taken with a grain of salt. 
As for the female sample, the common trends assumption appears clearly to be violated since 
the placebo-reform is significant in the two years preceding the deregulation (see column 3, 
table 6). This problem is consistent with concerns in Lergetporer et al. (2016) that differences 
between treatment and control groups may in some cases be too heterogeneous to identify a 
causal difference-in-difference estimator.  
Table 6: Placebo-tests checking whether the common trends assumption holds 
 
Men full-time  Woman full-time  
  (1) (2) (3) 
  
Placebo-reform all 
sectors 
Placebo-reform only 
construction 
Placebo-reform 
all sectors 
2001 0.03 0.06**  -0.09 
2002 0.01 0.01 0.03 
2003 0.02 0.03 0.09** 
2004 0.02 0.03 0.09** 
  0.25 0.24 0.27 
N  9682 5621 1280 
Source: Microcensus 2000-2010. 
Lergetporer et al. (2016) address this in one of their estimations using propensity score 
matching. In doing so, the negative effect on incomes as a result of the deregulation all but 
disappears. This speaks for the results obtained in this study, nevertheless optimizing the 
chances of casual interpretations remain an important field for future policy research also in 
the case of the German crafts sector.  
6. Discussion  
This study is one of the first to exploit a natural experiment to examine the income premiums 
resulting from occupational licensing. This study challenges the mainstream view that there is 
a significant income premium benefiting professionals in licensed occupations. I find no 
evidence that reforming the traditional licensing scheme in the German crafts sector 
negatively affected the incomes of male craftsmen overall. Certain groups may have been 
affected (men in the construction sector negatively and females positively), however in both 
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cases, I find worrying signs that the common trends assumption may not be met, reflecting a 
potential problem that is for the moment left unaddressed.  
Previous studies highlight the mechanism whereby market entry barriers lead to higher prices 
and hence increase producers’ incomes. However, other mechanisms that counterweigh this 
may be at work, which can help explain my contradictory findings. First, it is possible that 
there are no – or very low – economic rents in licensed occupations to begin with. Several 
contributions in the literature have challenged the Cournot theorem, according to which a 
competitive equilibrium only occurs as the number of firms proceeds to infinity (see e.g. 
Fama and Laffer, 1972; Stiglitz, 1987 p. 1042; and Bresnahan and Riess, 1991). In the case of 
Germany, by the end of 2003 – just before the reform took place – there were roughly 75,000 
firms operating in the 53 different trades that make up the deregulated market segment (see 
Mueller, 2006). Hence, competition may already have been (close to) sufficient to ensure 
prices close to marginal costs.  
Moreover, the demand-side should also be considered. Quality may be lower in non-
competitive markets, which over time could have reduced consumers’ willingness to pay for 
the service. The empirical literature on the link between occupational licensing and quality is 
inconclusive (see e.g. Carroll and Gaston, 1983; Shilling and Sirmans, 1988; and Angrist and 
Guryan, 2007). Higher prices under licensing could also have led consumers to other means 
of acquiring the service or simply resigning to an inadequate status quo and purchasing no 
service at all. In both cases, demand for crafts services would be lower under occupational 
licensing putting a downward pressure on the incomes of licensed professionals and free entry 
could have sparked new earning potentials.  
A licensing requirement may also increase incomes simply due to increased human capital 
and/or as a result of signaling to consumers that the occupation provides services of a 
particular quality (see Weeden, 2002). In this case, licensing would indeed lead to higher 
incomes and, vice versa, deregulation would lead to lower incomes. However, these 
developments are then a result of changes in productivity of professionals and not economic 
rents. The results in this study lend some credibility to this thesis as the removal of 
occupational licensing in the German craft sector did not affect Meister-companies, i.e. 
incumbents in the market.  
Also, other (and less restrictive) education policies and means to signal quality such as 
screening, reputation mechanisms or voluntary certification could achieve the same outcome 
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as licensing. If consumers have the means to find the quality that they seek, market entrants 
that propose a lower price/quality bundle should not pose a threat to incumbents. In the 
German case, the Meister-certificate still exist in the deregulated segment and indeed 
consumers of crafts services perceive that Meister craftsmen in deregulated trades offer higher 
quality than their non-Meister counterparts (see Fredriksen et al., forthcoming).  
7. Conclusion  
The insights from this study are relevant for the current policy discussions of harmonizing 
national labor markets in Europe where proponents stress the importance of achieving a 
unified European labor market whereas opponents worry about the potential adverse effects of 
a race to the bottom in terms of government regulation. This study criticizes the methodology 
and interpretations in existing studies on the income effects of the German deregulation and 
generally the established findings in the literature on occupational licensing and incomes.  
The standard explanation for why occupational licensing increases incomes of licensed 
professional is reduced competition, which allows them to charge higher prices. Two different 
stories may however be told depending on the degree of competition in the regulated market: 
If competition is a regulated market is nonetheless high, there is no room to charge higher 
prices. If competition is low, so might productivity and incentives to innovate be. If the 
quality of products suffers, the demand-side will put a stop on the scope to raise prices. In 
either of these two cases, licensing would not lead to higher incomes.   
The main implication that can be derived from my results is that public regulation is likely to 
affect economic outcomes through a variety of channels where some are more present in the 
policy debate than others. On top of this, effects may well vary across population groups. For 
these reasons, regulatory interventions in markets should not be taken lightly, but enacted 
with care and continually evaluated as the consequences unfold.  
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Abstract 
Difference-in-difference estimation is a popular tool to gauge the effects of economic policies. 
In recent years, many papers have applied this tool to the German deregulation of the crafts 
sector in 2004 to draw lessons regarding the economic effects of occupational licensing. 
However, a difference-in-difference estimator is only valid when the treatment and 
comparison units would have evolved similarly in absence of the reform, an assumption 
which is non-testable. This paper investigates whether the policy insights based on existing 
studies hold water when the synthetic control method is used whereby comparison units are 
selected in systematic ways in order to resemble treated units. Overall, this robustness-check 
confirms the findings using difference-in-differences estimation, yet it also yields some 
interesting nuances notably regarding market exits.  
JEL Classification:  
Keywords: Synthetic control, Selection on observables, Occupational licensing, 
Craftsmanship  
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1. Introduction 
The German crafts sector presents researchers with a golden opportunity to examine the 
effects of occupational licensing since the scheme was recently reformed in a way that 
resembles a natural experiment. Prior to 2004, all German craft occupations were subject to a 
licensing scheme through the so-called “Meisterpflicht”, a requirement to hold a Meister-title 
(an advanced vocational certificate) in order to found a company. The reform abolished the 
licensing scheme for certain craft occupations whereas others remain subjected to the 
traditional licensing scheme. 
In recent years there has therefore been a surge of studies using the German crafts case and 
the deregulation in 2004 in other to examine economic effects of occupational licensing by 
means of the conventional difference-in-differences estimator (e.g. Rostam-Afschar, 2014; 
Runst et al. forthcoming; Runst, 2018; Koch and Nielen, 2016; Lergetporer et al., 2016; 
Damelang et al., 2017; Fredriksen, 2018). 
Difference-in-differences estimation is a popular methodology among economists in order to 
gauge the effects of policy interventions that affect only a sub-group of the total population. A 
survey of economic studies published in 6 economic journals from 1990 to 2000 identifies 92 
papers using this methodology (see Bertrand et al., 2004). There is good reason for this as it 
can circumvent the problem of unobserved heterogeneity. By comparing the difference in the 
treated group and the control group before and after a given intervention, the difference-in-
differences estimator neither requires a perfectly randomized experiment nor controlling for 
systematic differences between the two groups.  
However, the difference-in-differences estimator is only a casual effect of a given policy 
intervention when, in absence of the treatment, both treatment and control group would have 
followed the same trends over time, commonly referred to as the parallel trends assumption. 
A major concern in the policy evaluation is therefore whether in practice, the parallel trends 
assumption is plausible (Ryan et al., 2015).  
A critical investigation of the validity of difference-in-differences estimation in the studies of 
the German crafts reform in 2004 has however so far not gone beyond standard placebo-tests. 
Yet, the parallel assumption depends on the non-treatment outcome for the treatment group 
after an intervention, which by definition is not observable, and hence it is in fact non-
testable. Thus, investigating alternative methods that avoid this assumption altogether are 
warranted (Krief et al., 2016). 
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This study therefore re-examines the effects of the 2004 deregulation on market entry and 
exits, the share of migrants and incomes using the synthetic control method. Synthetic control 
estimation addresses the above-mentioned methodological concerns of conventional 
difference-in-differences estimation by carefully selecting comparison units in order to reduce 
bias. As such, this study contributes to the existing literature by investigating the robustness 
of results obtained.  
The use of occupational licensing in the crafts sector is still part of the German policy debate 
und one of the leading parties (CDU) favors a reversal of the 2004 reform. Making sure that 
views on the deregulation are founded on solid scientific evidence is therefore important. 
Also, this paper contributes to a general debate on the reliability of difference-in-differences 
estimates. Given the frequent use of this methodology to advice policymakers on the effects 
of their actions, such research is warranted. 
This paper is organized as follows: Part two acquaints the reader with the use of occupational 
licensing in the German crafts and existing studies on the deregulation that came into effect in 
2004. Part three details the synthetic control method used as robustness-checks for current 
findings in the literature regarding the 2004 deregulation. Part four presents the results and 
part five concludes.  
2. The German crafts sector and the 2004-reform 
The German craft sector is regulated by the so-called Trade and Crafts Code 
(Handwerksordnung) and comprises about 5 million professionals in 93 trades
23
, which make 
up about 12% of the working population.  
The Meister-title plays an important role in the German crafts. It is the highest degree of 
vocational training and internationally recognized as tertiary education. In order to acquire it a 
professional must first undergo basic training (typically 3 years), which takes place both in a 
private company and in college, and become a so-called Geselle. Thereafter, additional 
training and exams involving occupation specific knowledge as well as knowledge about 
business management and pedagogy must be passed to acquire and associated exams in order 
to become a Meister, (see Mueller, 2014). 
                                                          
23
 The term “trade” pertains directly to the craft sector, whereas the term “occupation” is more general since a 
given occupation can contain both craft and non-crafts workers, as well as different craft trades. When referring 
to the German context, I will use the term “trade” to remain true to the German regulation. However, for insights 
on regulation, I will use the term “occupation” to align with the relevant literature. 
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Between 1953 and 2004, having a Meister-title was mostly a prerequisite to found a company 
in the crafts. The so-called “Hartz Reforms” of 2004 removed (fully or partially) the licensing 
requirements for certain trades in the German crafts sector.  
Recently, a number of studies have been published that evaluate the economic effects of this 
reform (see Rostam-Afschar, 2014; Runst et al., forthcoming; Lergetporer et al., 2016; Koch 
and Nielen, 2016; Damelang et al. 2017; Zwiener, 1997; and Fredriksen, 2018). In particular, 
the studies by Runst et al. (forthcoming), Runst (2018) and Fredriksen (2018) are interesting 
since they rely on a novel classification scheme to isolate the crafts in population-wide 
datasets, which is vital in order to identify the effects of the policy intervention.  
To summarize, these three studies provide policy-makers with the following insights: 
Removing occupational licensing leads to market entry, especially of low-qualified craftsmen, 
as well as market exits (Runst et al., forthcoming). The proportion of self-employed migrants 
as well as migrants employee increases, the latter effect however only concerns untrained 
individuals (Runst, 2018). No significant income effects of removing occupational licensing 
could be detected (Fredriksen, 2017). 
Contrary to other case studies on occupational licensing, the German crafts studies could all 
exploit the fact that the reform only affected some individuals and therefore apparently 
provides researchers with a “natural” control group. Hence, common to these studies is a 
reliance on difference-in-differences estimation to gauge the effects of the 2004 regulation.  
However, in contrast to laboratory experiments, natural experiments rarely fulfill the random 
treatment condition. In the case of the German crafts deregulation, the original bill relied on 
objective criteria such as hazardousness and contribution to vocational training in the crafts. If 
a trade was deemed to be potentially hazardous to third parties it would remain fully regulated 
or would only be partially deregulated and likewise if it made significant contributions to 
vocational training in Germany (see Bundestag, 2003a; and Bundestag, 2003b). Furthermore, 
there is evidence for interest group lobbying during the parliamentary discussions (see 
Bundestag, 2011; Bulla, 2012).
24
 This speaks against random treatment assignment. 
Yet, none of the existing studies on the German deregulation go beyond conventional 
difference-in-differences estimation. Possible identification problems are assessed based on 
                                                          
24
 One member of parliament made the following statement concerning a trade which was intended to be 
deregulated: ”Surgical device mechanics [Chirurgiemechaniker] play an important role in my local election 
district. Many of them vote for SPD [Social Democratic Party]”, (Bulla, 2012). 
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outcome observations in the pre-treatment period, although what matters for casual 
interpretation is what might have occurred in post-reform period. Also, while the placebo-test 
is in most cases passed, Zwiener (2017) and Fredriksen (2018) find worrying indications of 
the opposite. A further cause for concern are the findings in Lergetporer et al. (2016), who 
attempt to correct for differences in the treatment and control group and as a result see their 
estimated reform effect on incomes greatly influenced. 
This calls for a robustness-check of the established findings using data driven procedures to 
construct the best possible counterfactual, which is the aim of this paper. More specifically, 
insights from Runst et al. (forthcoming) on market entry and exit after the German reform as 
well as in Runst (2018) on migrant (self)-employment and Fredriksen (2018) on incomes, are 
proofed using the synthetic control method first introduced to the economic science in Abadie 
and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010). 
Several papers have shown that this is a useful endeavor. In their pioneering work on the 
synthetic control method, Abadie et al. (2010) re-evaluate the effects of California’s tobacco 
control program and find much stronger effects that reported in earlier studies relying on 
cross-section estimates. In their re-analysis of a pay-for-performance initiative in the British 
health sector, Kreif et al. (2016) also uses the synthetic control method and find, in contrast to 
previous studies using difference-in-differences estimation, that mortality was not reduced 
and in some case even increased. O’Neill et al. (2016) re-examines the best practice tariffs 
scheme also in the British health sector using both the synthetic control method, a lagged 
dependent variable approach and matching on past outcomes. Finally, Peri and Yasenov 
(2018) using again the synthetic control method to confirm existing findings that influx of 
Cuban immigrants into Miami in 1980 had no effect on local wages.  
3. Methodology 
3.1 Data 
To conduct the empirical analysis German microcensus data is used. There are several reasons 
for choosing the microcensus. Firstly, many of the existing studies on the 2004-deregulation 
use the microcensus and since this analysis complements existing results in the literature, it is 
preferable to use similar data set-up in order to achieve a comparable a robustness analysis.  
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Secondly, when attempting to make the treatment- and comparison groups as similar as 
possible, it is beneficial to have many potential covariates at disposal. The microcensus is a 
broad survey which covers personal information (gender, year of birth, family status, 
citizenship etc.), labor market information (labor market status, occupation), human capital 
accumulation (schooling, further qualifications), total net income, retirement provisions) and 
household characteristics (marital status, number of children etc.).  
Finally, as always when making comparative policy analysis, it is important to have reliable 
and representative data. The German microcensus is a representative official sample survey of 
the German population. It covers 1% of the population and is conducted annually. The 
mandatory nature of the census survey guarantees a low rate of item-non-response for most 
questions. 
If one is to assess the implications of a particular policy change in the crafts sector, it is 
paramount that the sample - and in particular the treatment groups - only comprise individuals 
within this sector. The microcensus does not contain direct information on whether a 
professional works in the crafts sector. However, craftsmen can be distinguished from non-
craftsmen on the basis of the occupational classification code (KldB1992). Most existing 
studies on the German crafts deregulation do this by the “eye-balling method”.  
For the purpose of this paper, a more rigorous method first proposed in Runst et al. 
(forthcoming) for identifying the crafts is employed, which combines the occupation codes in 
the microcensus with data from the Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training 
on the share of crafts apprentices within each occupational code. Only occupations where this 
share exceeds 60% are considered as crafts here, which excludes individuals in the 
agricultural or industrial or service sectors of the economy, which are unaffected by changes 
in crafts legislation.  
Cleaners as an occupational group are also excluded from the sample as there are reasons to 
doubt that this occupation code in the dataset can be considered a craft trade.
25
 Furthermore, 
owing to its size (45% of all individuals in deregulated trades in the microcensus dataset), 
wrongfully including the cleaner occupation would severely bias any general conclusions 
about the reform.   
                                                          
25
 As in: P. Runst, J. Thomä, K. Haverkamp and K. Müller, ‚A replication of ‘Entry regulation and 
entrepreneurship: a natural experiment in German craftsmanship‘ (forthcoming). 
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The traditional occupational licensing scheme was only ever relevant for self-employed. 
Hence, the analysis is mostly restricted to this sub-group. However, in the case of migrants, 
effects on the self-employed and their employees are assessed separately as the literature 
seems to suggest that in this case, employees might be indirectly affected by regulations 
directed at employers.  
Lastly, as this analysis pertains to labor market participation, individuals younger than 18 or 
older than 66, are excluded from the sample.  
Runst et al. (forthcoming), Runst (2018) and Fredriksen (2018) use the microcensus dataset 
with these same adjustments pooled for the period 2000-2010. For the synthetic control 
estimations, it is however necessary to transform the data into a panel dataset. Hence 
individual observations are first aggregated into one observation for each of the 92 
occupations. Furthermore, all the 52 deregulated trades are then aggregated into one treated 
unit as suggested in Abadie et al. (2010). Finally, since the length of the pre-treatment period 
is particularly important for synthetic control estimations, the period considered is extended 
back to 1995, which yields 9 pre-treatment years.
26
  
The final sample for the robustness-check presented in this analysis consists of ca. 1000-5000 
observations (depending on the variable considered), one for each occupation at each point in 
time where 16 observations are in the treatment group. Table 1 provides a descriptive 
summary of the variables used for this study. The market exit and exit variables are 
constructed as described by Rostam-Afschar (2014), based on the non-mandatory question 
about the employment status in the previous year, by comparing the current employment 
status with the one in the previous year. This non-mandatory question was included before 
2005 for 0.45 % of the German population and for 1 % of the German population in 2005 and 
2009. The migrant variable is the likelihood of being a migrant. It is equal to one if an 
individual migrated to Germany at some point in their life and zero otherwise. The income of 
self-employed craftsmen is based on the answer to the question “how high was your personal 
net total income last month”?   
  
                                                          
26
 In the case of market entry and exit, it was not possible to include the year 1996 due to a lack of observations.  
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Table 1: Outcome- and predictor means 
  
Average of all 
deregulated 
occupations 
Average of all 
control 
occupations 
Dependent variables     
Market entry 0,02 0,04 
Market exit 0,13 0,18 
Share of self-employed migrants 0,10 0,08 
Share of all migrant employees 0,14 0,09 
Share of untrained migrant 
employees 0,21 0,17 
Incomes 1282,45 1583,26 
Predictors     
Age 41,94 40,83 
Male 0,62 0,65 
Hours worked 37,28 37,77 
Being married 0,61 0,59 
Having children 0,41 0,41 
Lower secondary school 0,68 0,49 
Intermediate secondary school 0,22 0,22 
University entrance qualification 0,10 0,30 
No professional qualification 0,10 0,08 
Vocational training 0,74 0,61 
Advanced vocational training 0,13 0,12 
University entrance qualification 0,03 0,19 
Source: Microcensus 1995-2010. 
3.2 The synthetic control framework 
The synthetic control method relaxes the difficult parallel trend assumption necessary for 
unbiased difference-in-differences estimates. The general principle behind the method is to 
weight the outcomes of the comparison units in order to construct a superior counterfactual 
for the treated unit, with the weights being chosen such that the synthetic control best 
reproduces the outcome variable of the treated unit in the pre-treatment period. The set of 
possible comparison units is commonly referred to as “donor pool”. 
The formal framework
27
 of synthetic control estimation can be summarized as follows: The 
method takes as starting point a balanced panel dataset with t=1,…,T. Pre-intervention 
periods are noted T0 and post-intervention periods are noted T1. This means that a treatment 
                                                          
27
 The explanations and notations of the theoretical framework are identical to those in Abadie et al. (2010). 
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unit is exposed to the treatment during periods T0+1,…,T and not in the period 1,…,T0. The 
synthetic control is defined as a weighted average of the units in the donor pool. It is 
expressed as a (J x 1) vector of weights W=(w2,…,wj+1)’, with 0≤wj≤1 for j=2,…,J and 
w2+…+wj=1.  
The values of W are selected such that the characteristics of the treated unit best resemble the 
characteristics of the synthetic control. Consider X1, which is a (k x 1) vector containing the 
pre-intervention characteristics of the treated unit and X0, which is an identical vector for the 
units in the donor pool. The differences between the treated- and comparison units are then 
given by X1-X0W. The synthetic control selected, W*, minimizes the size of this difference. 
∑ 𝑣𝑚(𝑋1𝑚 − 𝑋0𝑚𝑊)
2
𝑘
𝑚=1
 
𝑣𝑚 is here the weight assigned to each control unit in the donor pool.  
The synthetic control estimator is then given by the comparison between the outcome for the 
treated unit and the outcome for the synthetic control at that period. The outcome of unit j at 
time t is noted Yjt. Yi is a (T1 x 1) vector of the post-intervention values for the treated unit. 
Y0 is a (T1 x J) matrix containing the post-intervention values for the comparison units. The 
treatment effect is the given by: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 −∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
 
The synthetic control approach has many advantages. Firstly, it allows the effects of 
unobserved confounders to vary over time, by reweighting the comparison group so that it has 
similar characteristics as the treatment group. Difference-in-differences estimation in contrast 
assumes that the effects of confounding variables are constant over time. Secondly, synthetic 
control estimation is very transparent. It is apparent whether the treated unit is sufficiently 
matched by the synthetic control and on this basis, the analyst can decide whether or not to go 
forth with the analysis. With conventional difference-in-differences estimation, estimate 
uncertainty is commonly reported by the standard error. The standard error however gives no 
information about the overlap (or lack thereof) between the treatment- and the control group, 
although these models have been shown to perform poorly when it is not the case (see e.g. 
Dehejia and Wahba, 1999/2002).  
77 
 
The synthetic control method also has certain disadvantages. Notably, a systematic selection 
of comparison units can of course only be done on the basis of observed characteristics. 
Hence, idiosyncratic shocks affecting the outcome variable may make the synthetic control 
only appear similar and hence bias results. Abadie et al. (2010) show that this problem is 
alleviated when the pre-intervention period is long. In the case of the German crafts 
deregulation, our pre-treatment period is 9 years (from 1995 to 2004). Also, it will lead to a 
loss of observations as in our case individual observations need to be aggregated to the crafts 
trade level. However, this is a cost we are willing to pay as it has been said that “the main 
barrier to quantitative inference in observational studies is not the small-sample nature of the 
data, but rather the absence of an explicit mechanism that determines how comparison units 
are selected” (Abadie et al., 2015, p. 496).  
3.3 Identifying predictors of the outcome variable 
The synthetic control estimation is performed by the command synth in Stata. The program 
selects the comparison units, which are most similar to the treatment units based on 
observable characteristics that predict the outcome in the pre-treatment period. Researchers 
must however make the important choice of which predictors to include in the selection 
procedure. The principle aim is to include predictors that have a stable relationship with the 
outcome variable (McCelland and Gault, 2017). For the purpose of this analysis, several 
combinations of predictors are considered and the preferred predictor-specification will be the 
one with the lowest Root Mean Squared Percentage Error (RMSPE), which measures the pre-
treatment fit.  
An obvious predictor is the lagged outcome variable because most structural economic 
outcomes, and certainly those considered in this analysis, do not vary much over time. Also, 
the lagged outcome variable will capture unobserved characteristics that influence the 
outcome variable. Athey and Imbens (2006) argue that including other variables rarely matter. 
Hence, in a first set of specifications, lags of the outcome variables are the only predictors in 
the synthetic control estimation. The recommendation from Ferman et al. (2016) to try 
different sets of lags and report the results from all of them is here followed. A first estimation 
includes the first, middle and last lag of the outcome variable as predictor as Gault (2017) 
recommend including only a few lags. A second estimation includes the last three lags of the 
treatment period as predictors, which is one of the recommendations in Kaul et al. (2016). A 
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final estimation, inspired by the recommendations in both Kaul et al. (2016)
28
 and McClelland 
and Gault (2017)
 29
, includes lags of the two years when the outcome variable is closest to its 
average in the pre-treatment period.  
It has been pointed out that if other observables outcomes help predict the outcome, omitting 
them can bias the synthetic control outcome in the post-treatment period (Kaul et al, 2016). 
This is a serious critic as it relates to the credibility of the counterfactual, which is the aim of 
the synthetic control method to ensure. In order to address this possibility, a second set of 
specifications uses both the above-mentioned combinations of lags and other economic 
variables from the microcensus dataset that have predictive power for explaining the 
dependent variable (subsequently called “covariates”) as predicators.  
The findings in Heckman (1997) support a generous selection of covariates since the lowest 
bias values were obtained when the covariate vector included a rich set of variables relevant 
to modeling the probability of treatment. Also, Hahn and Shi (2017) recommend a relatively 
large number of predictors compared to the number of comparison units. Hence, the aim was 
to use all the significant covariates from the difference-in-differences in Runst et al. 
(forthcoming), Runst (2018) and Fredriksen (2018) as predictors. However, some control 
variables used in the original papers had to be dropped in order to be able to construct a 
synthetic control. 
In the case of market entry and exit, the following covariates are included: Age, gender, a 
dummy for being married, a dummy for having children, education, professional qualification, 
a dummy for residing in former Eastern-Germany and the size of the resident city. In the case 
of migrants, the only covariates included are age, gender, marital status, the number of 
children and city size. Finally, in the case of incomes, the covariates included are age, age 
squared, gender, having a migration background, hours worked, highest obtained general 
education and vocational qualification, marital status and the number of children.  
Concerns have been raised that including lagged outcomes as predictors may eliminate the 
effect of the other predictors (Kaul et al. 2016). A final predictor specification therefore only 
includes the covariates listed above as predictors without including lags of the outcomes. Due 
to the encompassing nature of the microcensus, the large number of variables at disposal 
should reduce the concern that important unobservable predictors are omitted.  
                                                          
28
 Kaul et al. suggest using an average of the outcome across all treatment years.  
29
 McClelland et al. recommend choosing a small number of lags that follow the outcome trend in the pre-
treatment period.  
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For all these calculations, the donor-pool consists of both fully regulated trades and partially 
regulated trades. The reasons for this is that only considering the still fully regulated trades as 
comparison units would imply relying on very few craft observations in the control group. 
Also, previous studies typically find no reform effects in the partially deregulated trades. 
However, the sensitivity analysis addresses this issue further. 
3.4 Sensitivity analysis 
A general concern for comparative policy evaluation is that the intervention may have 
“spread” to units that were originally unaffected (Abadie et al., 2010). Avoiding such 
“tainted” units in the donor-pool is important for synthetic control estimation. The same 
procedure used in this paper to identify the crafts also sorts the German crafts trades into one 
of three groups: Fully deregulated in 2004, partially deregulated in 2004, or still regulated. 
In the 52 occupations classified as fully deregulated trades, market entry is now free. These 
trades form the treatment group. The traditional licensing scheme remains unchanged for the 
6 in the data categorized as still fully regulated. These are ideal comparison units; however 
there are few of them. The final 35 trades are classified as partially deregulated in 2004. For 
these trades, the law allows the crafts chambers to permit experienced employees without a 
Meister-degree to start a business.
30
 Prerequisites to be granted permission are that the 
employee have worked in the field for six years or more and have worked in a managerial 
position for four years or more or intend to hire a third-party company manager that meets the 
same criteria.
31
 An alternative specification removes these partially deregulated trades from 
the donor-pool.  
Also, the policy literature has pointed out the danger of fake treatment effects (see e.g. 
Angrist and Krueger, 1999; Peri and Yasinov, 2018). This is particularly true with case 
studies that involve a small number of units of observation. Since the dataset had to be 
aggregated to the occupation-level in order to conduct the synthetic control method, a large 
observation loss occurred. Hence, as suggested in Abadie et al. (2003 and 2010), inference is 
analyzed through placebo tests. The placebo-tests are done using the specification including 
the best predictors and all occupations in the donor-pool. The basic idea is to apply the 
synthetic control method iteratively to every potential control in the donor pool (so-called “in-
                                                          
30
 HwO §7b, Altgesellenregel.  
31
 Betriebsleiterregelung. 
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space placebos”). Thus, it becomes apparent if any treatment effect detected is large relative 
to the distribution of placebo effects estimated for occupations not affected by the 
deregulation.  
4. Results 
4.1 Results in the original studies using difference-in-differences 
Runst et al. (forthcoming) find that as expected the reform did cause a surge of new 
entrepreneurship in fully deregulated trades since it is found that market entry has increased 
between 1.0 to 1.8 percentage points. Contrary to Rostam-Afschar (2014, 2015), which this 
study replicates among other things by using a different classification scheme for the crafts, 
no effect was found on market entry with regards to trades where occupational licensing still 
exists in a milder form. Also in contrast to Rostam-Afschar (2014, 2015) who finds no effect 
of the deregulation on market exit, Runst et al. (forthcoming) find that the deregulation has 
increased exit probabilities in the fully deregulated trades by between 2.0 and 2.5 percentage 
points.  
Runst (2018) concludes that the deregulation of occupational licensing has led to an increase 
in the proportion of self-employed migrants in the crafts sector. He finds an economically 
sizeable effect as the share of migrants has increased by 5 percentage points on average since 
the deregulation took place in the fully trades. Furthermore, it is found that the reform 
increased the likelihood of migrants to work as untrained employees in the crafts but not 
among highly trained employees or mid-range training levels. No significant effect of the 
reform was found on the share of migrants (whether self-employed or employed) in the trades 
that are still partially deregulated.  
Fredriksen (2018) examine income effects only for self-employed and finds, contrary to 
Lergetporer et al. (2016) and Damelang et al. (2016), which also examine changes in incomes 
as a result of the deregulation, no convincing evidence of a significant negative effect. No 
overall significant negative effect on the incomes of all male craftsmen as a result of the 
deregulation in 2004. A closer look reveals that the deregulation appears to have reduced 
incomes by 6% in the construction crafts; however the standard placebo-test for parallel 
trends in the treatment and comparison group is not passed in this case. Surprisingly, a rather 
sizeable positive income effect for female craftsmen emerges, which is significant at the 10% 
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level. However, also in this case, the placebo-test simulating an intervention in the pre-reform 
period is not passed.  
These results using conventional difference-in-differences estimation is summarized in 
table 2.  
Table 2: Overview of original studies 
Study Outcome variable Main findings 
Runst et al. 
(forthcoming) 
1) Market entry 
1) 1,0-1,8 percentage points higher entry in 
fully deregulated trades  
2) Market exit 
2) 2-2,5 percentage points higher 
likelihood of market exit 
Fredriksen 
(2017) 
Net monthly income 
for self-employed 
No overall significant effects on incomes 
of self-employed. Possible negative effects 
for males in the construction sector do not 
pass placebo-tests 
Runst (2018) 
1) Self-employed 
migrants 
1) +5 percentage point higher share of 
migrants 
2) Total migrant 
employees 
2) +4 percentage point higher share of 
migrants 
3) Untrained vs. 
trained migrant 
employees 
3) 5-7 percentage points increase in the 
share of untrained migrants, no significant 
effects for trained migrants 
Source: Original studies. 
4.2 The synthetic control 
The novelty of this study is to apply the synthetic control method to the German crafts case 
instead of difference-in-differences estimations. Hence, we begin the presentation of our 
results by looking at the obtained pre-treatment fit of the synthetic control estimations 
(RMSPE), which is useful when comparing different specifications of the same model, as well 
as the composition of the synthetic controls in the case of the different outcome variables.  
The combination of predictors that yields the best pre-treatment fit varies between the 
estimations. It is however noteworthy the absolute differences between the estimated RMSPE 
values is not large, meaning that the choice of the predictor specification should a priori not 
have a large impact on the validity (or lack thereof) of the synthetic control method. 
Furthermore, predictor specifications that include both a covariates and a combination of 
lagged outcomes consistently perform best.  
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In the case of market entry, the preferred specification is combining the covariates from the 
microcensus dataset with the lagged outcome variables for the first, middle and last year of 
the pre-treatment period, see table 3 column 1. This particular specification yields a RMSPE 
of 0,00059. In the case of market exit, using covariates and the two outcome lags most similar 
to the pre-treatment mean gives the best fit, see table 3, column 2. For incomes the best the 
best fit (lowest RMSPE) is achieved using covariates as well as the outcome variable in the 
first, middle and last year of the pre-treatment period (table 3, column 6), which is also the 
case when the reform-effect on self-employed migrants is assessed (table 3, column 3). For 
the analysis of migrant employees, the best fit is achieved when using only covariates or 
covariates in combination with the two lagged outcomes closest to the pre-treatment year 
(table 3, column 4). The synthetic control estimations of the reform-effect on untrained 
migrant employees is the only case where relying solely on lagged outcomes yields the best 
pre-treatment fit (table 3, column 5).  
Table 3: Pre-treatment fit 
  
RMSPE 
entry 
 
(1) 
RMSPE          
exit 
 
(2) 
RMSPE 
migrant 
self-
emp 
(3) 
RMSPE 
migrant 
employees 
(4) 
RMSPE 
migrants 
untrained 
(5) 
RMSPE 
incomes 
 
(6) 
Only outcome lags             
LAG_A 0,00266 0,03410 0,00928 0,01053 0,03816 0,02691 
LAG_B 0,00290 0,03332 0,00758 0,00813 0,02266 0,14187 
LAG_C 0,00296 0,03269 0,00816 0,00575 0,04175 0,04048 
Only individual 
characteristics             
vars 0,00279 0,09274 0,01146 0,00490 0,03921 0,02690 
Combination of the 
above             
vars+LAG_A 0,00059 0,01858 0,00933 0,01004 0,05117 0,01781 
vars+LAG_B 0,00177 0,01541 0,00999 0,00784 0,03206 0,02591 
vars+LAG_C 0,00202 0,01208 0,01146 0,00490 0,03921 0,02456 
Note: For Lag_A, the first, middle and last lags of the outcome variable are predictors. For Lag_B, the three last 
lags of the treatment period are predictors. For Lag_C, the two lags closest to the pre-treatment mean are 
predictors. For Lag_x+vars, lag specification x and covariates are predictors. 
Source: Microcensus 1995-2010. 
The composition of the synthetic control varies between the various specifications and 
outcome variables, which the tables in annex 1 clearly illustrate. For market entry, non-crafts 
occupations make up more than 2/3 of the synthetic control, whereas in the case of market 
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exits, the synthetic control is solely comprised of craft occupations. In the case of incomes, 
non-crafts occupations is still one of the biggest contributors to the synthetic control, however 
in the preferred specification with covariates the main contributor are gunsmiths, an 
occupation with is part of the German crafts sector that was partially deregulated in 2004. In 
the case of migrants, very few occupations contribute more than 1% to the synthetic control. 
Among those that do, non-craft occupations again make up the most important part.  
It is interesting to note that in some cases, the synthetic control is very diverse. We have 
chosen not to include occupations that contribute less than 1% to the synthetic control. A sum 
of weights far from 100 therefore indicates that many different occupations contribute in a 
minuscule way to the synthetic control. In most cases, these tiny contributions to the synthetic 
control aggregated actually makes up more than half of the synthetic control.  
The fact that the synthetic controls predominantly consists of non-crafts occupations is also 
interesting. Whereas the three difference-in-differences studies highlighted in this paper do 
include non-craft occupations in the control group for sensitivity analysis, other published 
studies on the German crafts deregulation do not even consider non-crafts occupations in the 
analysis.  
4.3 Effects of removing occupational licensing in the German crafts 
The already well-established negative link between occupational licensing and market entry 
are negatively is confirmed also with the synthetic control method. However, it is worth 
noting that while the market entry reform-effect (gap between deregulated trades and their 
synthetic control) is positive, it still evolves very erratically in the post-reform period (figure 
1). It is interesting to note a drop around 2008, which was not visible in the original study 
using difference-in-differences that seems to indicate that market entry was negatively 
affected by the financial crisis 
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Figure 1: Gap in market entry between deregulated trades and synthetic control 
A: Only lags as predictors 
 
B: Combination of lags and covariates as predictors 
 
Note: For Lag_A, the first, middle and last lags of the outcome variable are predictors. For Lag_B, the three last 
lags of the treatment period are predictors. For Lag_C, the two lags closest to the pre-treatment mean are 
predictors. For Lag_x+vars, lag specification x and covariates are predictors. 
Source: Microcensus 1996-2010. 
It has been investigated whether the above-mentioned effect on market entry only concerns 
entrants from outside of German that have not had the same access to the German 
qualification system. In line with the findings in Runst et al. (forthcoming) and Rostam-
Afschar (2014) we however also find that market entry has increased among self-employed 
craftsmen of German origin (see figure 2).  
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Figure 2: Gap in market entry between deregulated trades and synthetic control- Only German 
craftsmen 
 
Note: Best1 refers to the specification with only lagged outcome variables as predictors that achieved the lowest 
RMSPE. Best2 refers to the specification with lagged outcome variables and covariates that achieved the lowest 
RMSPE:  
Source: Microcensus 1996-2010. 
On the more controversial issue of market exit, we are unable to confirm the positive effect 
reported in Runst et al. (forthcoming), see figure 3. The synthetic control estimations appear 
rather to confirm the findings in Rostam-Afschar (2014) who could not detect any exit effects.  
Figure 3: Gap in market exit between deregulated trades and synthetic control 
A: Only lags as predictors 
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B: Both lags and covariates as predictors 
 
Note: For Lag_A, the first, middle and last lags of the outcome variable are predictors. For Lag_B, the three last 
lags of the treatment period are predictors. For Lag_C, the two lags closest to the pre-treatment mean are 
predictors. For Lag_x+vars, lag specification x and covariates are predictors. 
Source: Microcensus 1996-2010. 
The share of self-employed migrants has more or less continuously increased since 2004 
(figure 4), which is not surprising given that the traditional licensing requirement only 
concerned founding a company. Hence, this is the direct effect of the deregulation in 2004. 
However, the effect is almost as strong for migrant employees, which confirms the existence 
of an indirect effect of the regulation coming from employment practices (figure 5). Contrary 
to the findings in the original paper, an effect on untrained migrants cannot be detected 
(results not presented). However, this is likely due to the low number of observations in the 
synthetic control estimations when the sample is thus reduced.  
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Figure 4: Gap in the share of self-employed migrants between deregulated trades and 
synthetic control 
A: Only lags as predictors 
 
B: Combination of lags and covariates as predictors  
 
Note: For Lag_A, the first, middle and last lags of the outcome variable are predictors. For Lag_B, the three last 
lags of the treatment period are predictors. For Lag_C, the two lags closest to the pre-treatment mean are 
predictors. For Lag_x+vars, lag specification x and covariates are predictors. 
Source: Microcensus 1995-2010. 
  
-0,04
-0,02
0
0,02
0,04
0,06
0,08
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
LAG_A
LAG_B
LAG_C
-0,02
0
0,02
0,04
0,06
0,08
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
vars
vars+LAG_A
vars+LAG_B
vars+LAG_C
88 
 
Figure 5: Gap in the share of all migrant employees between deregulated trades and synthetic 
control 
A: Only lags as predictors 
 
B Combination of lags and covariates as predictors 
 
Note: For Lag_A, the first, middle and last lags of the outcome variable are predictors. For Lag_B, the three last 
lags of the treatment period are predictors. For Lag_C, the two lags closest to the pre-treatment mean are 
predictors. For Lag_x+vars, lag specification x and covariates are predictors. 
Source: Microcensus 1995-2010. 
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It is again interesting to note a drop in the share of migrants in the crafts sector in 2007/2008 
that is not apparent in the difference-in-differences calculations in the original paper. Again, 
this is likely due to the financial crisis that worsened the general labor market situation in 
Germany in those years.  
The income estimations are particularly interesting since here Fredriksen (2017) finds a result 
which is contrary to what the existing literature has claimed. Will the synthetic control 
estimation confirm no effect or will a negative effect of the deregulation emerge? The results 
show no decline in incomes as a result of removing occupational licensing in the German 
crafts sector (figure 6). If anything, there appears to be a rise in incomes in the specification 
where covariates are included as predictors (figure 6B). 
Figure 6: Income gap between deregulated trades and synthetic control 
A: Only lags as predictors 
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B: Both covariates and lags as predictors 
 
Note: For Lag_A, the first, middle and last lags of the outcome variable are predictors. For Lag_B, the three last 
lags of the treatment period are predictors. For Lag_C, the two lags closest to the pre-treatment mean are 
predictors. For Lag_x+vars, lag specification x and covariates are predictors. 
Source: Microcensus 1995-2010. 
The results in Fredriksen (2018) suggest that male craftsmen working in the construction 
sector may have been (as opposed to all craftsmen seen together) affected by the reform. 
However, the synthetic control specification on this particular sub-sample (not presented here) 
yields very erratic curves, which may again be due to the loss of power when reducing the 
sample and a rather poor pre-treatment fit and it is our assessment that this specification does 
not add to the analysis.  
Notice that in the case of incomes, the fit in the pre-treatment years is generally not fully 
convincing. The income difference between the deregulated trades and their synthetic control 
is large and varies substantially as opposed to being a constant line equal to zero which is 
desirable. Additionally, the specification with only individual characteristics and no lags (not 
shown here) was immediately dropped because of the lack of pre-treatment fit. Abadie et al. 
(2015, p. 500) warn “we do not recommend using this [aka: Synthetic control] method when 
the pretreatment fit is poor”.  
There is no definition of “poor fit” in the context of synthetic control estimation. We therefore 
use a published study looking at incomes using synthetic control for reference. Peri and 
Yasinov (2018) in their analysis of the income effect of migration influx on incomes using 
synthetic control estimations obtain a maximum difference in the (log of) wage between the 
treatment- and synthetic control of about 0,07 points and characterize this pre-treatment fit as 
“reasonably good”. In the case of the German crafts, the maximum difference in logs obtained 
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is lower for all retained specifications, hence the pre-treatment fit is considered to be good 
enough to trust the results obtained. 
4.4 Senstivity analysis 
When we exclude the crafts occupations that were partially deregulated in 2004, our main 
results do not change, hence the donor-pool does not appear to contain treated units. The 
figures in annex 2 show that a reform-effect is still present for market entry and migrants 
whereas no effect is detected on incomes or market exits.  
A number of placebo-test were furthermore conducted in order to check whether differences 
between treatment and control group can occur by pure chance. For these tests, similarly to 
the results presented before, the synthetic control method is applied successively to outcomes 
market entry, market exit, share of migrants and incomes. The donor pool consists of both 
fully regulated and partially deregulated crafts trades.  
However, this time the treatment groups are all of the in reality untreated observations. This 
makes for a lot of treatment effects as the number of control occupations is large. We remove 
from the result figures placebo-interventions where the pre-treatment fit is particularly poor 
based on a comparison of their mean and standard deviation in the pre-treatment period to that 
of the true treatment group. This not only increases the visual interpretability of the resulting 
graphics, it is also in line with Abadie et al. (2010, p. 502) that point out that such placebo 
estimations „do not provide information to measure the relative rarity of estimating a large 
post-intervention gap“. 
The placebo-tests confirm the main findings in this paper. The gray lines in the graphs show 
the difference in outcome between each occupation in the donor pool and its respective 
synthetic version. The superimposed black line denotes this gap for the actual treatment 
group.  
In the case of market entry, figure 7 shows that the true treatment effect shows one of the 
strongest increases compared to the synthetic control in the post-treatment period. In the case 
of market exit, figure 8 shows that the true treatment group does not stand out compared to 
the placebo-interventions. An exception to this are the last two years of the period under 
consideration where market exits in the true treatment group increase markedly compared to 
their synthetic control. However, whether this is due to the reform is uncertain since a time 
lapse of 5 years is considerable.  
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Figure 7: Gaps in the share of market entries in deregulated trades compared to synthetic 
control for 32 placebo interventions  
 
Note: The predictor specification used is the combination of lagged outcome variables and covariates that 
yielded the lowest RMSPE.  
Source: Microcensus 1995-2010. 
 
Figure 8: Gaps in the share of market exits in deregulated trades compared to synthetic control 
for 28 placebo interventions  
 
Note: The predictor specification used is the combination of lagged outcome variables and covariates that 
yielded the lowest RMSPE.  
Source: Microcensus 1995-2010. 
In the case of migrants, the placebo-test also suggests that the estimated treatment effect is a 
true treatment effect (see figure 9 and figure 10). These calculations for the sub-sample of 
untrained employees are left out as the calculations showed no treatment-effect for this group. 
The estimated gap for the deregulated trades during the post-treatment period is unusually 
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large relative to the distribution of the gaps for non-affected occupations, a finding which is 
particularly true for all migrant employees.  
Figure 9: Gaps in the share of self-employed migrants in deregulated trades compared to 
synthetic control for 31 placebo interventions  
 
Note: The predictor specification used is the combination of lagged outcome variables and covariates that 
yielded the lowest RMSPE.  
Source: Microcensus 1995-2010. 
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Figure 10: Gaps in the share of migrant employees in deregulated trades compared to 
synthetic control for 59 placebo interventions  
 
Note: The predictor specification used is the combination of lagged outcome variables and covariates that 
yielded the lowest RMSPE.  
Source: Microcensus 1995-2010. 
A placebo-test in the case of incomes seems less necessary as a treatment-effect could not be 
detected in the first place. Since an effect of occupational licensing on incomes has often been 
found in the literature, we however still present the placebo calculations in figure 11. Again, 
the true treatment group is represented by the black line. It appears evident that removing 
occupational licensing has not led to a decrease in incomes in deregulated trades, as one could 
have expected based on existing studies on occupational licensing. Possible reasons 
explaining this finding are detailed in Fredriksen (2018). 
  
-0,06
-0,04
-0,02
0
0,02
0,04
0,06
0,08
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
95 
 
Figure 11: Income gaps to synthetic control for deregulated crafts trades and 35 placebo 
interventions  
 
Note: The predictor specification used is the combination of lagged outcome variables and covariates that 
yielded the lowest RMSPE.  
Source: Microcensus 1995-2010. 
5. Conclusion 
Using adequate comparison units is crucial in policy evaluation studies. If comparison units 
are not sufficiently similar to those subjected to the intervention of interest, any difference in 
the outcomes may simply be due to different characteristics of the groups.  
O’Neill et al. (2016) find that there is no one policy evaluation methodology that delivers 
correct results in every situation. Based on this, the authors recommends “that the base case 
analysis should present results from the method(s) that uses the ‘most plausible’ identification 
assumption, but then the sensitivity analysis should present findings from method(s) that 
make alternative, but still ‘somewhat plausible’ identification assumption. 
This paper has tried to accommodate the second part of this quote. Three existing studies 
looking into economic effects of removing occupational licensing regulation in certain 
German crafts trades in 2004 using difference-in-differences estimation are replicated using 
the synthetic control method. The latter methodology is an interesting tool to gauge the effects 
of economic policies since it constructs based on available data the best possible 
counterfactual and makes apparent whether an appropriate control could be created or not. 
Overall, using synthetic control estimation does not significantly alter conclusions drawn 
based on difference-in-differences estimations (table 4). 
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Table 4: Reform effects using synthetic control versus difference-in-differences 
Outcome 
Difference-in-differences 
estimation Synthetic control estimation 
Market entry Increase Increase 
Market exit Increase No effect 
Migrant self-employment Increase Increase 
Migrant employment Increase Increase 
Migrant untrained 
employment Increase No effect 
Incomes No effect No effect 
 
However, using a different methodology has provided some interesting new insights. Firstly, 
additional information was revealed regarding the negative effects of a general economic 
downturn on market entry in the crafts sector and migrant integration via the crafts. Secondly, 
the positive effect on market exit found in the original study does not appear to be robust. The 
reform-effect on market exits has been contested in the literature. The findings in this study 
confirm those in Rostam-Afschar (2014), the first study to use difference-in-differences in 
order to estimate the effects of the 2004-deregulation, that did not pick up any effect on exits. 
It should however be mentioned that the increase in exit found in Runst et al. (forthcoming) 
primarily stem from a specification using a different dataset. An alternative conclusion could 
therefore be that the microcensus is not suited to study market exits in the crafts. Thirdly, the 
previous finding that reform effects have been concentrated on untrained migrants could not 
be confirmed.  
Finally, it is interesting to note that while difference-in-differences appears appropriate to 
study the deregulation in 2004, referring to the reform as a “natural experiment in the crafts 
sector” as Damelang et al. (2017) does is not correct. In fact, using a more transparent method 
like synthetic control estimation reveals that non-crafts occupations appear to be the better 
counterfactual. This shows that the issue of the counterfactual may be trickier than one might 
expect.  
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Annex 1: Composition of the synthetic control 
The following tables show composition of the synthetic control for the specification with the 
lowest RMSPE both solely comprising of lags and the best-treatment fit with both lags and 
other covariates. Occupations that contribute to less than 1% of the synthetic control are not 
included.  
Table A.1: Market entry 
LAG_A vars+LAG_A 
Occupation Weight Occupation  Weight 
Non-crafts 61,2 Non-crafts 77,3 
  
Butcher 6,8 
  
Plasterer 9,3 
  
Chimney 
sweeper 6,1 
Sum 61 Sum 100 
Source: Microcensus 1996-2010.  
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Table A.2: Market exit 
LAG_C vars+LAG_C 
Occupation Weight Occupation  Weight 
Non-crafts 0 Non-crafts 0 
Precision mechanic 1,7 Precision mechanics 5,5 
Metal worker 2,2 
Installer and heating 
manufacturer 29 
Plumber 3,1 Dispensing optician 11,6 
Installer and heating manufacturer 3,1 Electrical technician 3,9 
Automotive technician 3,1 Electrical engine manufacturer 1,6 
Mechanic for agricultural and 
construction machinery 2,9 Baker 4,7 
Gunsmith 2,7 Hairdresser 43,7 
Dental technician 3,4   
 Dispensing optician 3,6   
 
Orthopaedic technician 1,8   
 Electrical technician 3,8   
 
Electrical engine manufacturer 2,3   
 
Hearing aid acousitician 3,1   
 
Communication technician 1,3   
 Baker 3,5   
 Butcher 27,1   
 
Oven and air heating manufacturer 2,3   
 
Hearing aid acousitician 1,6   
 Roadbuilder 2   
 
Thermal and acousticinsulation fitter 3,3   
 Glazier 2,3   
 Carpenter 4,5   
 Roof tiler 2,8   
 Joiner 4,6   
 Hairdresser 4,5   
 Sum 97 Sum 100 
Source: Microcensus 1996-2010.  
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Table A.3: Migrants- Self-employed 
LAG_B vars+LAG_A 
Occupation Weight Occupation  Weight 
Non-crafts 2,1 Non-crafts 40 
  
Mechanic for tyres and 
vulcanization 1,1 
  
Gunsmith 1,9 
Sum 2 Sum 43 
Source: Microcensus 1995-2010.  
 
Table A.4: Migrants- All employees 
LAG_C vars+LAG_C 
Occupation Weight Occupation  Weight 
Non-crafts 28,1 Non-crafts 43,7 
Sum 28 Sum 44 
Source: Microcensus 1995-2010. 
 
Table A.5: Migrants- Untrained employees 
LAG_B vars+LAG_B 
Occupation Weight Occupation  Weight 
Non-crafts 24,7 Non-crafts 45,2 
  
Mechanic for tyres and 
vulcanization 1,1 
  
Precision mechanic 6,7 
Sum 25 Sum 53 
Source: Microcensus 1995-2010. 
 
Table A.6: Incomes 
LAG_A vars+LAG_ 
Occupation 
Weigh
t Occupation  
Weigh
t 
Non-crafts 30 Non-crafts 24,4 
Glass blower and glass apparatus builder 16,4 
Glass blower and glass apparatus 
builder 6,7 
  
Metalworker 1,2 
  
Coachbuilder 1,9 
  
Gunsmith 36,1 
  
Orthopaedic technician 6,4 
  
Painter and laquerer 2,9 
Sum 46 Sum 80 
Source: Microcensus 1995-2010.  
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Annex 2: Composition of the donor pool 
The following figures show the gap between the deregulated trades and their synthetic control 
when the trades that where partially deregulated in 2004 (referred to as A-trades) are excluded 
from the donor pool. 
Figure A.1: Market entry 
 
Note: Note: Best1 refers to the specification with only lagged outcome variables as predictors that achieved the 
lowest RMSPE. Best2 refers to the specification with lagged outcome variables and covariates that achieved the 
lowest RMSPE:  
Source: Microcensus 1996-2010. 
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Figure A.2: Market exit 
 
Note: Note: Best1 refers to the specification with only lagged outcome variables as predictors that achieved the 
lowest RMSPE. Best2 refers to the specification with lagged outcome variables and covariates that achieved the 
lowest RMSPE:  
Source: Microcensus 1996-2010. 
 
Figure A.3: Migrants- Self-employed 
 
Source: Microcensus 1995-2010. 
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Figure A.4: Migrants- Employees 
 
Source: Microcensus 1995-2010. 
 
Figure A.5: Incomes 
 
Note: Note: Best1 refers to the specification with only lagged outcome variables as predictors that achieved the 
lowest RMSPE. Best2 refers to the specification with lagged outcome variables and covariates that achieved the 
lowest RMSPE:  
Source: Microcensus 1995-2010. 
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Zusammenfassung: Die deutsche Handwerksordnung regelt die Unternehmensgründung in 
handwerklichen Berufen durch die Vorgabe verpflichtender Qualifikationsstandards. Im Jahr 
2004 wurde der Marktzugang im Handwerk durch eine Novellierung der Handwerksordnung 
dereguliert, sodass für mehr als die Hälfte aller Handwerksberufe seitdem keine 
Meisterpflicht mehr gilt. Seit der Reform wird eine politische und wissenschaftliche 
Diskussion zu den einzel- und gesamtwirtschaftlichen Effekten dieser Deregulierung geführt. 
Fast fünfzehn Jahre nach der Deregulierung können aus den bisherigen Studien grundlegende 
Effekte abgeleitet werden und Forschungslücken definiert werden, um die weitere 
wirtschaftspolitische Diskussion wissenschaftlich zu fundieren. Der vorliegende Artikel fasst 
dafür die theoretischen Grundpositionen und die empirischen Studien zur Entwicklung des 
deutschen Handwerkssektors nach der Deregulierung zusammen und formuliert anschließend 
zu schließende Forschungslücken zur umfassenden wirtschaftspolitischen Bewertung der 
Handwerksreform.  
Abstract: The German Trade and Crafts Code constitutes the regulatory framework for 
entrepreneurial activities in the crafts sector. Among other things, it prescribes mandatory 
qualification standards for starting a new craft firm. In 2004, the Trade and Crafts Code, and 
in particular, market entry, was liberalized so that qualification standards are no longer 
required in about half of all crafts occupations. Since this reform was implemented, there has 
been a vivid political and academic discussion about the economic effects. Almost fifteen 
years after, we summarize the empirical research literature. Further, we identify gaps in the 
literature and formulate open research questions. 
 
JEL: L15, L51, J44, J48, O52 
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1. Einleitung 
Die deutsche Handwerksordnung regelt den handwerklichen Sektor der deutschen 
Volkswirtschaft, unter anderem in Hinblick auf Ausbildungsstandards und den Marktzugang 
neuer Unternehmen. Eine zentrale Steuergröße liegt im Erwerb des Meisterbriefs als 
qualifikatorischem Standard. Dieser war bis zum Jahr 2004 für die aktuell 93 Gewerbe des 
Handwerks mit wenigen Ausnahmen die Voraussetzung zur Gründung und Führung eines 
Betriebes sowie zur Ausbildung von Gesellen. Im Zuge der sog. Hartz-Reformen erfolgten 
2004 zum einen eine Deregulierung von 52 dieser nunmehr sogenannten „B1-Handwerke“32, 
in denen die Meisterpflicht komplett entfiel, sowie zum anderen Ausnahmeregelungen in fast 
allen verbleibenden sogenannten „A-Handwerken“, die einer leichten Deregulierung 
entsprechen. Insgesamt wurde also der Marktzugang im Handwerkssektor teilweise 
dereguliert.
33
 
Die politische Diskussion über die Effekte der Deregulierung und dabei insbesondere über 
den Wegfall der Meisterpflicht hält weiterhin an: Während die Europäische Kommission an 
einer weitergehenden Marktöffnung zum Ausbau eines europäischen Binnenmarkts für 
Handwerksdienstleistungen arbeitet
34
, fordern verschiedene politische Akteure in Deutschland 
die Prüfung einer Rückabwicklung der Deregulierung und einer Wiedereinführung 
qualifikationsgebundener Markteintrittsschranken.  
In Folge der anhaltenden politischen Diskussion entwickelte sich in den vergangenen Jahren 
ein verstärktes Interesse an den ökonomischen Effekten der Deregulierung. Der vorliegende 
Beitrag fasst die theoretischen Argumente und den aktuellen Stand der empirischen Evidenz 
zusammen und schafft so einen kompakten Überblick für die künftige wirtschaftspolitische 
Debatte. Hierfür werden zunächst die zwei zentralen theoretischen Zugänge hinsichtlich der 
Reformeffekte gegenübergestellt, dann die empirischen Studien zu den Reformeffekten 
zusammengefasst und schließlich eine Zusammenfassung und weiterer Forschungsbedarf 
formuliert.  
                                                          
32
 Der Name bezieht sich auf die Anlage B1 der Handwerksordnung, in welcher die vollständig deregulierten 
Handwerkszweige aufgelistet sind. Weiterhin gibt es die Anlage B2, in der handwerksähnliche Gewerbe 
aufgeführt sind, die nie einer Meisterpflicht unterlagen. 
33
 Für Details siehe K. Müller: Erste Auswirkungen der Novellierung der Handwerksordnung von 2004, in: 
Göttinger Handwerkswirtschaftliche Studien (2016), H. 74, ifh Göttingen sowie P. Runst et al.: A replication of 
‚Entry regulation and entrepreneurship. A natural experiment in German craftmanship‘, in: Empirical Economics 
(i.E.). 
34
 EU-Kommission: Mitteilung der Kommission an das europäische Parlament, den Rat und den europäischen 
Wirtschafts- und Sozialausschuss. Bewertung der nationalen Reglementierungen des Berufszugangs, COM 
2013/676 final vom 02.10.2013, Brüssel 2013. 
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2. Theoretische Zugänge 
Die Frage nach der Notwendigkeit von Marktzugangsbeschränkungen im Handwerkssektor 
wird vor allem auf Basis zweier theoretischer Perspektiven analysiert, die konträre 
Grundpositionen einnehmen. Auf der einen Seite steht die Wettbewerbsperspektive, welche 
staatlichen Regulierungstatbeständen grundsätzlich kritisch gegenübersteht. Der zweite 
relevante Ansatz nimmt eine Marktversagens-Perspektive ein, welche die Existenz von 
Informationsasymmetrien als Marktversagenstatbestand betont.
35
  
2.1 Wettbewerbsperspektive 
Die Wettbewerbsperspektive
36
 nimmt an, dass Marktzutrittsschranken vor allem Ziel und 
Folge branchenbezogener Lobbyarbeit zur Erzielung von Monopolrenten sind. Eine zentrale 
Annahme dieser Perspektive ist, dass auf Handwerksmärkten kein Marktversagen vorliegt, 
bzw. dass im Fall asymmetrischer Informationsverteilung zwischen Produzenten und 
Konsumenten marktendogene Mechanismen einen Ausgleich der Informationslage bewirken 
können. Unter dieser Bedingung haben berufsbezogene Zugangsbeschränkungen 
Wohlfahrtsverluste zur Folge. Im regulierten Markt stellt die Meisterpflicht somit eine 
Markteintrittsbarriere dar, die als Fix-Kosten-Term für potentielle Unternehmen zu verstehen 
ist. Wenn der potentielle Unternehmer die Fix-Kosten der geforderten Qualifikation nicht 
tragen kann oder will, ist es ihm untersagt, ein Unternehmen zu gründen. Über einem 
bestimmten Kostenniveau verhindert die Meisterpflicht damit den Zugang von Unternehmen 
– je höher die Marktzugangskosten, desto geringer ist die Anzahl der Anbieter auf dem Markt. 
Wenn die Anzahl der Unternehmen gering ist, steigen die Preise über die Grenzkosten und es 
entsteht eine Monopolrente bei insgesamt sozial ineffizienter realisierter Menge. Die fehlende 
                                                          
35
 Vgl. für die grundlegende Unterscheidung vgl. im Folgenden: A. Haupt, N. Witte: Occupational Licensing and 
the Wage Structure in Germany, in: KIT Working Paper Series in Sociology (2016), H. 4. sowie S. Svorny: 
Licensing, market entry regulation, in: B. Bouckaert, G. De Geest (Hrsg.): Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 
Volume III: The Regulation of Contracts, Cheltenham 2000, S. 296-328. 
36
 Die folgenden ökonomischen Grundannahmen zur Wettbewerbsperspektive basieren auf Branstetter et al.: Do 
Entry Regulations Deter Entrepreneurship and Job Creation? Evidence from Recent Reforms in Portugal, in: The 
Economic Journal, 124. Jg. (2014), H. 577, S. 805-832; M. M. Kleiner: Licensing occupations. ensuring quality 
or restricting competition? Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research (2006a); S. 
Svorny: Licensing, market entry regulation, in: B. Bouckaert, G. De Geest (Hrsg.): Encyclopedia of Law and 
Economics Volume III: The Regulation of Contracts, Cheltenham 2000, S. 296-328. 
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Wettbewerbsintensität kann ebenso dazu führen, dass Firmen, die geringere Qualität 
erbringen, nicht vom Markt verschwinden, sodass die durchschnittliche Qualität sinkt.
37
  
In den Handwerkszweigen, die 2004 dereguliert wurden, sind demnach zunächst zwei 
Teilmärkte entstanden: ein Meister-Markt und ein Nicht-Meister-Markt, der potentiell 
niedrigere Qualität zu geringeren Preisen anbietet. Annahmegemäß sinkt die Nachfrage im 
ersten Markt, da Kunden mit den entsprechenden Präferenzen in den zweiten Markt 
abwandern. Diese Kundenverlagerung kann im ersten Markt zu einem Austritt bestehender 
Unternehmen führen. Im Nicht-Meistermarkt entsteht eine neue (oder zuvor auf grauen 
Märkten bediente) Kundennachfrage, die von neu gegründeten Unternehmen bedient wird. 
Der Nachfrageanstieg im zweiten Markt ist größer als die Nachfragereduktion im ersten 
Markt, sofern die höheren Preise vor der Deregulierung die Nachfrage reduziert hatten. 
Dementsprechend können positive Beschäftigungseffekte erwartet werden. Die neu 
entstandene Nachfragekurve ist elastischer als die Nachfragekurve im Meistermarkt, da davon 
auszugehen ist, dass sich preissensible Kunden mit geringerer Qualitätsnachfrage auf diesem 
Markt bewegen.  
Unter der Annahme, dass potentielle Informationsasymmetrien von den Marktakteuren 
überwunden werden können, entsteht ein qualitativ und preislich differenzierter Markt, wobei 
ggf. auftretende durchschnittliche Qualitätssenkungen vollständig durch die Präferenzen der 
Konsumenten bedingt sind und der Preis Informationen über die Qualität des Produkts 
kommuniziert. Der Meisterbrief reduziert auf diesem Markt die Suchkosten für Konsumenten 
hinsichtlich zu erwartender Qualität und ist somit lediglich ein möglicher Bestandteil der im 
Marktprozess entstehenden informationsökonomischen Mechanismen zur Vermittlung von 
Produkt- und Dienstleistungseigenschaften.
38
  
In Hinblick auf den Erwerb von Qualifikationen ist anzunehmen, dass die Ausbildung direkte 
monetäre- sowie Opportunitätskosten bedingt. Daher ist für Anbieter niedrigerer Qualität ein 
Verzicht auf Teile der Ausbildung rational und entspricht den Präferenzen der Nachfrager. Es 
ist folglich eine Abnahme der Humankapitalbildung (im Fall des Handwerks besonders der 
Meisterausbildungen) zu erwarten. Die Meisterpflicht beeinflusst außerdem das Kosten-
                                                          
37
 Eine Markteintrittsbarriere muss allerdings nicht zwingend die Existenz einer Monopolrente bedingen, sofern 
hinreichend Wettbewerb im regulierten Markt besteht. Für das Handwerk ist dies denkbar, da viele 
Handwerkerleistungen auch von nicht handwerklichen (und damit nicht zugangsbeschränkten) Handels- und 
Industrieunternehmen angeboten werden (können), sodass potentiell auch auf die zugangsbeschränkten 
Unternehmen auch vor der Deregulierung Wettbewerbsdruck ausgeübt wurde. 
38
 Vgl. K. Fredriksen, P. Runst, K. Bizer: Masterful Meisters? Voluntary Certification and Quality in the German 
Crafts Sector, in: German Economic Review (i.E.). 
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Nutzen-Kalkül der betrieblichen Entscheidung in Hinblick auf die Gesellenausbildung. Der 
Grund hierfür ist, dass über die Meisterausbildung nicht nur die Marktzugangsberechtigung 
erworben, sondern gleichzeitig eine Ausbildereignungsprüfung abgelegt wird. Durch diese 
Ausbildungserlaubnis erhöht sich die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass ein Betrieb ausbildet. Denn 
zum Zeitpunkt der Entscheidung, ob ein meistergeführtes Handwerksunternehmen Gesellen 
ausbilden möchte oder nicht, spielt der zeitliche und materielle Aufwand für den früheren 
Erwerb der Meisterqualifikation keine Rolle mehr, es handelt sich um sunk costs. In 
deregulierten Handwerkszweigen hingegen verfügen Unternehmensgründer ohne 
Meisterausbildung i.d.R. nicht über eine Ausbildungserlaubnis und kommen möglicherweise 
zu dem Ergebnis, dass die Kosten des Erwerbs einer Ausbildungsberechtigung den 
potenziellen Nutzen übersteigen. Es kann somit vermutet werden, dass die 
Ausbildungsleistung von Nicht-Meister-Unternehmen geringer ist.  
Es ist daher anzunehmen, dass die neuen Unternehmer eine geringere durchschnittliche 
Ausbildung besitzen und dadurch potentiell geringere formale unternehmerische 
Qualifikationen besitzen. Darüber hinaus sind die Investitionen in den Marktzugang für 
Betriebe ohne die Pflicht zum Meisterbrief geringer, sodass ein schneller Wechsel in andere 
Beschäftigungen mit geringeren Verlusten der Investition in das eigene Humankapital 
möglich wird, was für eine höhere Markteintritts- und -austrittsdynamik der Betriebe im 
deregulierten Markt spricht.  
Ferner ist anzunehmen, dass die Meisterpflicht zu Ausschlusseffekten im Hinblick auf die 
Qualifikationserfordernisse führt, die in besonderem Maße bei Migranten zutreffen, da ihre 
spezifischen Kosten für die Erlangung der Qualifikation aus verschieden Gründen (z.B. 
Kindheit in einem nicht-europäischen Schulsystem) oftmals prohibitiv hoch sind. Es kann 
also angenommen werden, dass ein Wegfall der Meisterpflicht die Selbstständigenquote von 
Migranten erhöht. Wenn diese neuen Unternehmer informelle Netzwerke nutzen, um 
Angestellte zu rekrutieren, wird sich der Migrantenanteil auch unter den abhängig 
Beschäftigten erhöhen.  
Aus Wettbewerbsperspektive sind auf Basis obiger Annahmen folgende Entwicklungen durch 
die Deregulierung zu erwarten: Die Einkommen (ggf. Monopolrenten) der Anbieter sinken, 
die Preise sinken während das Marktvolumen steigt, ebenso wie die Zahl der Marktein- und -
austritte. Die Gesamtbeschäftigung steigt bei höherer Beteiligung von Migranten, gleichzeitig 
sinkt die Zahl der Berufsbildungsabschlüsse. Die empirisch überprüfbaren Komponenten der 
Wettbewerbsperspektive sind damit die Reformeffekte in Hinblick auf die: (1) Einkommen 
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der Anbieter (2) Preise und Marktvolumen, (3) Anzahl der Unternehmen sowie Marktein- und 
austritte, (4) Erwerbsbeteiligung von Migranten, (5) Beschäftigungseffekte sowie (6) Zahl der 
Berufsbildungsabschlüsse. 
2.2 Marktversagenshypothese 
Die theoretische Gegenposition basiert auf informationsökonomischen Argumenten und geht 
davon aus, dass qualifikationsbezogene Regulierung vor allem dem Konsumentenschutz 
dient. Die zugrundeliegende Annahme der Marktversagenshypothese besteht in einer 
asymmetrischen Informationsverteilung zwischen Produzenten und Konsumenten, die nicht 
durch marktendogene Instrumente aufgelöst werden kann. Die berufsbezogene 
Markteintrittsregulierung wird als eine effiziente Lösung dieses Informationsproblems 
angesehen.
39
  
Auf Handwerksmärkten existiert demnach eine asymmetrische Informationsverteilung 
hinsichtlich der Produkt- und Dienstleistungsqualität, da angenommen wird, dass 
handwerkliche Tätigkeiten in den Bereich der Erfahrungs-, oder Vertrauens-/Glaubensgüter 
fallen. Die Produkte werden zumeist individuell angefertigt und es gibt kaum Möglichkeiten 
zur Standardisierung, sodass Verbraucher Qualitätsunterschiede zwischen Produkten und 
Produzenten nicht oder nur schwer unterscheiden können. Hierdurch entsteht ein erheblicher 
Wissensunterschied zwischen Produzenten und Konsumenten. Die differenzierten 
Zahlungsbereitschaften für verschiedene Qualitätsniveaus resultieren dabei nicht in 
entsprechend informativen Preisen. Im Extremfall entsteht ein „Market for Lemons“, in dem 
Anbieter hoher Qualität den Markt verlassen (Adverse Selection), da der Konsument nur 
bereit ist, den Durchschnittspreis zu zahlen und er nicht weiß, ob er es mit einem Anbieter 
hoher oder niedriger Qualität zu tun hat. Die durchschnittliche Qualität von Produkten und 
Dienstleistungen (und die entsprechende Zahlungsbereitschaft) sinken sukzessive durch den 
Austritt von Anbietern hoher Qualität bis der Markt zusammenbricht.
40
 
                                                          
39
 Vgl. C. C. von Weizsäcker: A welfare analysis of barriers to entry, in: The bell journal of economics (1980), 
H. 11, S. 399–420 sowie E. Graddy: Toward a general theory of occupational regulation, in: Social Science 
Quarterly (1991), H. 72, S. 676–695, zitiert nach A. Haupt, N. Witte: Occupational Licensing and the Wage 
Structure in Germany, in: KIT Working Paper Series in Sociology (2016), H. 4. 
40
 Vgl. hierzu grundlegend G. A. Akerlof: The Market for “Lemons”. Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84. Jg. (1970), H. 3, S. 488-500; sowie zur 
Informationsökonomik des Handwerkssektors W. B. Röber: Eine informationsökonomische Analyse des 
Handwerks. Dissertation, Leuphana Universität Lüneburg 2009. 
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Als Gegenstrategie kann im regulierten Markt die Meisterpflicht als eine 
ausbildungsbezogene Marktzugangsbeschränkung genutzt werden, da sie mit dem Erwerb von 
berufsspezifischem Humankapital verbunden ist. Die Anbieter im regulierten Markt sind nach 
Erlangung des Qualifikationsgrads befähigt, ein höheres Qualitätsniveau anzubieten, das sie 
ohne die Meisterausbildung potentiell nicht erreichen könnten (Humankapitalbildung). 
Alternativ werden hauptsächlich diejenigen Personen eine Meisterausbildung beginnen, die 
davon ausgehen, die Prüfung erfolgreich abschließen zu können, um so der Kundenseite ihre 
Qualität zu signalisieren, selbst wenn die Ausbildung an sich keine Produktivitätssteigerung 
auslösen würde (Signalling).  
Aufgrund des höheren Humankapitalerwerbs wird davon ausgegangen, dass der 
zugangsbeschränkte Markt durch höhere Qualität gekennzeichnet ist und so ein sukzessiver 
Qualitätsverlust aufgrund asymmetrischer Informationsverteilung verhindert wird. 
Gleichzeitig wird angenommen, dass der durch die qualifikatorische Zugangsbegrenzung 
verminderte Wettbewerb im regulierten Markt nicht bewirkt, dass Handwerksunternehmen 
die Informationsasymmetrien zu ihrem Vorteil ausnutzen und systematisch niedrigere Qualität 
bei hohen Preisen erbringen. Die Meisterausbildung wird als ein Grund dafür angesehen, da 
sie die Herausbildung einer starken beruflichen Identität befördert, die sich u.a. durch 
intrinsische Qualitätsansprüche als Basis der Betriebsreputation und der Weitergabe 
impliziten Wissens im Rahmen der betrieblichen Ausbildung definiert. Dieses System 
qualifikatorischer Erfordernisse bei gleichzeitiger Reduktion des Marktdrucks durch 
Niedrigqualitätsanbieter kann dabei als eine spezifische deutsche institutionelle Lösung des 
Problems asymmetrischer Informationen interpretiert werden, die durch ein historisch 
gewachsenes Geflecht formeller und informeller Institutionen zwischen Marktzugang, 
Berufsidentität, Reputationsstreben, Qualitätsniveau und Ausbildungsneigung stabilisiert 
wird.  
Aus Marktversagensperspektive sind damit insbesondere zwei empirisch überprüfbare 
Komponenten relevant, nämlich die (6) Effektivität marktendogener 
Informationsmechanismen sowie (7) Entwicklung des durchschnittlichen Qualitätsniveaus 
und der Preise. 
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2.3 Überblick 
Tabelle 1 gibt auf Basis der beiden vorgestellten Grundpositionen einen Überblick zu den 
theoretisch zu erwartenden Effekten der Deregulierung. Außerdem werden die bisherigen 
empirischen Ergebnisse kompakt aufgelistet; eine ausführliche Vorstellung der einzelnen 
Studien folgt in Abschnitt drei.  
Tabelle 1: Übersicht über die untersuchten Studien
41
 
Abschnitt Variable Vorhersage Ergebnis Studien 
3.1 Einkommen 
negativ 
 
schwach 
negativ 
 
Bol (2014), Bol und Weede 
(2014), Lergetporer et al. 
(2016), Haupt (2016), 
Damelang et al. (2017), 
Fredriksen (2017), Koch und 
Nielen (2017)  
 Preise und Marktvolumen 
sinkende Preise, 
höheres 
Marktvolumen 
n/a n/a 
3.2 
Anzahl Unternehmen, 
Markteintritte & 
Marktaustritte 
positiv positiv 
Rostam-Afschar (2014, 2015), 
Müller (2014, 2016), Koch und 
Nielen (2017), Zwiener (2017), 
Runst et al. (i. E.) 
3.3 
Unternehmensgründungen 
und Beschäftigung von 
Migranten 
positiv positiv Runst (2017) 
3.4 Beschäftigung nicht eindeutig keine Effekte 
Koch und Nielen (2017), 
Zwiener (2017) 
3.5 
Anzahl der 
Berufsbildungsabschlüsse 
negativ widersprüchlich 
Müller (2016), Koch und 
Nielen (2017) 
3.6 
Herausbildung 
marktendogener 
Informationsmechanismen 
nicht eindeutig schwach positiv 
Fredriksen et al. (i.E.), Röber 
(2009) 
 Entwicklung der Qualität Nicht eindeutig n/a  
  
                                                          
41
 Die Literaturangaben der o.g. Studien sind in Kapitel drei aufgeführt. 
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3. Überblick über die empirische Literatur 
Bevor auf die einzelnen Studien eingegangen wird, ist es notwendig, zunächst auf die 
schwierige Datenlage zu verweisen. Die gesamte Population der Handwerksunternehmen 
wird zwar in den durch die Handwerkskammern geführten Verzeichnissen sowie in der 
Handwerkszählung erfasst. Allerdings sind diese Daten nur in aggregierter Form auf der 
Ebene der Handwerkszweige, nicht jedoch als Firmendatensätze verfügbar. Die aggregierte 
Form schränkt die Nutzungsmöglichkeiten dieser Daten auf nur wenige Fragestellungen 
(Zutritte und Austritte, Betriebsbestand, tätige Personen, Umsatz und Ausbildungsstand) ein. 
In den verfügbaren Individual- und Firmendatensätzen besteht hingegen die Problematik einer 
trennscharfen Abgrenzung des Handwerks. Es besteht zwar die Möglichkeit, für die 
Identifikation der Handwerksbeschäftigten hilfsweise auf die Klassifikation der Berufe und 
unterschiedliche Berufskennziffern zurückzugreifen. Da diese beruflichen Klassifizierungen 
allerdings nicht der offiziellen Liste der Handwerksordnung entsprechen, müssen für viele 
Studien Zweifel angemeldet werden, inwiefern die Untersuchungsgruppe tatsächlich aus 
Handwerksbeschäftigten nach der rechtlich vorgegebenen Klassifizierung besteht.
42
 
Darüber hinaus gehen mehrere Studien davon aus, dass die Reformeffekte durch Differenz-
von-Differenzen-Schätzungen (DvD) untersucht werden können, da man sowohl die 
deregulierte Gruppe (Treatment Gruppe) als auch die Vergleichsgruppe (Kontrollgruppe) vor 
und nach der Reform beobachten kann. Um kausale Zusammenhänge aufzudecken, fordert 
diese Methodik jedoch, dass die statistischen Parameter in zulassungsfreien und 
zulassungspflichtigen Handwerken – bis auf die Reformeffekte – dem gleichen Trend folgen 
(parallel-trends Annahme). Diese Annahme kann nicht vollständig überprüft werden. Die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass die Annahme zutrifft, sollte folglich durch verschiedene Tests 
abgeschätzt werden, was jedoch in einigen Studien nicht geschieht oder nicht zu eindeutigen 
Ergebnissen führt. Damit ist es teilweise problematisch, Aussagen über die Robustheit der 
Ergebnisse zu formulieren.  
 
                                                          
42
 Die Forschergruppe am ifh Göttingen entwickelte mit Blick auf diese Herausforderung ein Klassifizierungs-
Verfahren, um Individuen im Handwerkssektor von anderen Wirtschaftsbereichen abzugrenzen, vgl. P. Runst et 
al.: A replication of ‚Entry regulation and entrepreneurship. A natural experiment in German craftmanship‘, in: 
Empirical Economics. Die unterschiedliche Abgrenzungsverfahren und die mit ihnen verbundenen 
Einschränkungen werden ausführlicher besprochen in: K. Haverkamp: Das Handwerk – Zur definitorischen und 
statistischen Abgrenzung eines Querschnittsbereichs, in: Zeitschrift für KMU und Entrepreneurship (i.E.). 
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3.1 Einkommen  
Auf Basis der bisherigen Studien lässt sich festhalten, dass die Einkommenseffekte der 
Reform wahrscheinlich negativ, aber gering ausfallen. 
Sowohl Bol (2014)
43
 als auch Bol & Weede (2014)
44
 zeigen, dass Selbstständige bzw. 
Beschäftigte in regulierten Berufen grundsätzlich höhere Einkommen beziehen als in nicht 
regulierten Berufen. Deregulierung sollte demnach zu Einkommensverlusten führen. Beide 
Studien sind allerdings als problematisch zu betrachten, da sie aufgrund der Nutzung von 
Querschnittsdaten nicht als Untersuchung der kausalen Effekte der Handwerksreform 
verstanden werden können. 
Lergetporer et al. (2016)
45
 untersuchen auf Basis zweier Datensätze die Auswirkungen der 
Handwerksnovelle 2004 auf das Einkommen von Selbstständigen und abhängig Beschäftigten 
im Handwerk. Mit den Daten der Stichprobe der Integrierten Arbeitsmarktbiografien (SIAB) 
zeigen die Autoren, dass im Durchschnitt über die sechs Jahre nach der Novelle der 
durchschnittliche Tageslohn eines abhängig Beschäftigten in B1-Handwerken insgesamt 
geringfügig (-0,7%) gesunken ist. Bei Differenzierung nach Jahren zeigt sich, dass es in den 
ersten 4 Jahren keinen Effekt gab und erst für 2009 und 2010 ein deutlicher negativer 
Lohneffekt von -3% auftrat. Bei der Nutzung von Mikrozensusdaten im gleichen Zeitraum 
zeigen die Ergebnisse einen negativen Einkommenseffekt von -12% für alle Erwerbstätigen 
im Handwerk und von -9% für Selbstständige im Handwerk.
46
 Problematisch ist hieran, dass 
die Autoren Haushaltseinkommen anstatt Individualeinkommen nutzen und unklar bleibt, 
welches Abgrenzungsverfahren für die Population der Handwerksbeschäftigten in dem 
Mikrozensusdatensatz verwendet wurde.  
Damelang et al. (2017)
47
 nutzen ebenfalls die SIAB-Daten um den Effekt der 
Handwerksderegulierung auf das Einkommen von Erwerbstätigen in den B1-Handwerken zu 
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 T. Bol: Economic returns to occupational closure in the German skilled trades, in: Social Science Research 
(2014), H. 46, S. 9-22. 
44
 T. Bol, K. Weeden: Occupational Closure and Wage Inequality in Germany and the United Kingdom, in: 
European Sociological Review (2014), H. 19, S. 1-16. 
45
 P. Lergetporer, J. Ruhose, L. Simon: Labor Market Effects of Entry Barriers to Self-Employment. Evidence 
from Deregulating the German Crafts Sector, in: Ifo Center for the Economics of Education (2016), Ifo Institute. 
46
 Stärkere Effekte für Angestellte (im Vergleich zu Selbständigen) werden mit der divergierenden Entwicklung 
der Gesamtarbeitszeit erklärt, die bei den Selbstständigen größeren Anpassungen unterliegt. 
47
 A. Damelang, A. Haupt, M. Abraham: Economic consequences of occupational deregulation. Natural 
experiment in the German crafts, in: Acta Sociologica (2017), S. 1-16. 
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untersuchen. Es zeigt sich, dass der monatliche Lohn der abhängig Beschäftigten im 
deregulierten Bereich bis zum Jahr 2008 nur minimal gesunken ist.
48
  
Auf Basis von Daten des IAB-Betriebspanels und auf einem anspruchsvollen 
Abgrenzungsverfahren basierend, finden Koch und Nielsen (2017)
49
 keinen Effekt der Reform 
auf die Löhne der Erwerbstätigen im Handwerk.  
Fredriksen (2017)
50
 nutzt Mikrozensusdaten, um die Einkommenseffekte der Novelle auf 
verschiedene Gruppen von selbständigen Handwerkern zu untersuchen und findet keine 
signifikanten Einkommenseffekte. 
Haupt (2016)
51
 zeigt, dass die Arbeitnehmer in den deregulierten Handwerken geringere 
Lohnzuwächse zu verzeichnen haben als die Arbeitnehmer in den zulassungspflichtigen 
Berufen. Der Effekt der Reform auf die Löhne zeigt sich vor allem in Westdeutschland und 
für Niedrigqualifizierte, allerdings sind die Ergebnisse nur schwach signifikant. Interessant ist 
hierbei die Nutzung von Daten des Sozio-oekonomischen Panels (SOEP), die – im 
Unterschied zum Mikrozensus – Paneldaten liefern. Da folglich die gleichen Individuen über 
die Zeit untersucht werden, stellt nicht-beobachtbare Heterogenität in diesem Fall kein 
Problem dar. 
3.2 Anzahl Unternehmen, Markteintritte & Marktaustritte  
Deskriptive Statistiken bei Müller (2016)
52
, welche auf den Daten der 
Handwerkskammerverzeichnisse basieren, zeigen einen schlagartigen Anstieg der 
Neugründungen im Handwerk nach 2004. Es wird ferner gezeigt, dass sich die 
Marktaustrittsrate in den betroffenen Branchen ebenfalls deutlich erhöht hat. Müller (2014)
53
 
untersucht die Stabilität der Unternehmensgründungen im Handwerk und zeigt, dass die 
Überlebensraten der neu gegründeten Unternehmen im deregulierten Bereich nach der 
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 Die Autoren untersuchen allerdings nicht, ob die Annahme paralleler Trends („parallel trends assumption“) 
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Reform deutlich absinken, während sie im weiterhin regulierten Bereich der A-Handwerken 
gleich bleiben. 
Rostam-Afschar (2014, 2015)
54
 nutzt als erster Individualdaten des Mikrozensus, um zu 
prüfen, ob sich die Wahrscheinlichkeit, selbstständig zu werden, in den geöffneten 
Handwerkszweigen im Vergleich zu den nicht-deregulierten Gewerken erhöht hat. Die 
Ergebnisse belegen die These eines erhöhten Markteintritts; die stärksten Effekte zeigen sich 
für Niedrigqualifizierte. Einige Ergebnisse stehen allerdings im Widerspruch zu den 
theoretisch abgeleiteten Aussagen.
55
 So findet Rostam-Afschar, dass die Gründungszuwächse 
in den teilweise und vollständig deregulierten Gewerken gleich groß ausfallen. Gleichzeitig 
gibt es nach seinen Ergebnissen keine Hinweise darauf, dass die 
Austrittswahrscheinlichkeiten gestiegen sind. 
Runst et al. (2016)
56
 replizieren Rostam-Afschar (2014). Der zentrale Beitrag dieser Studie ist 
ein präziseres Abgrenzungsverfahren, um Handwerks- von nicht-Handwerksbeschäftigten zu 
unterscheiden. Die Befunde bestätigen zwar den von Rostam-Afschar festgestellten erhöhten 
Markteintritt in Folge der Reform. Es zeigt sich ein starker Reformeffekt in Form erhöhter 
Markteintritte in den B1-Handwerken, aber ein deutlich schwächerer Effekt in den teilweise 
deregulierten A-Handwerken. Im Gegensatz zu Afschar (2014) wird zusätzlich ein erhöhter 
Marktaustritt in den deregulierten Gewerken festgestellt.  
Koch & Nielen (2017)
57
 nutzen als Datenquellen zum einen das IAB-Betriebspanel, zum 
anderen aggregierte Unternehmensdaten des Zentralverbandes des Deutschen Handwerks. Sie 
zeigen eine deutliche Steigerung der Gründungszahlen in den zulassungsfrei gestellten 
Handwerkszweigen in Folge der Reform.  
Zwiener (2017)
58
 untersucht schließlich die Auswirkungen der Reform auf die Zahl der 
Betriebe und Neugründungen auf Basis von drei Datensätzen: der ZDH-, der SIAB- und der 
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Mikrozensusdaten. Auch hier zeigt sich eine positive Wirkung der Reform auf die 
Markteintritte.  
3.3 Erwerbsbeteiligung von Migranten 
Runst (2017)
59
 bestätigt die aus der Theorie abgeleitete Erwartung, dass Migranten nach der 
Reform verstärkt eigene Handwerksbetriebe gegründet haben, wobei der Migrantenanteil in 
den teilweise deregulierten A-Handwerken unverändert blieb. Der Anteil von abhängig 
beschäftigten Migranten im Handwerk ist nach der Reform ebenfalls gestiegen, was durch die 
Einstellung von Beschäftigten über informelle soziale Netzwerke der Unternehmer erklärt 
wird. 
3.4 Beschäftigung 
Koch & Nielen (2017)60 untersuchen die Effekte der Deregulierung auf die 
Gesamtbeschäftigung, sowie die Anteile der Betriebe mit Einstellungen bzw. Entlassungen 
auf Basis der Daten des IAB-Betriebspanels. Sämtliche Koeffizienten zeigen sich nicht 
signifikant. Allerdings verweisen die Autoren auf die Schwäche der IAB-Daten, die damit 
zusammenhängt, dass die Stichprobe nur substanzstarke Betriebe mit 
sozialversicherungspflichtig Beschäftigten einschließt. Die Autoren argumentieren, dass die 
gesamten Beschäftigungseffekte unter Berücksichtigung von Soloselbstständigen durchaus 
positiv ausfallen könnten. 
Zwiener (2017)61 untersucht die Auswirkungen der Reform auf die abhängige Beschäftigung 
im Handwerk auf Basis von zwei Datensätzen: der Mikrozensusdaten und der Stichprobe der 
integrierten Arbeitsmarktbiografien. Insgesamt gibt es keine statistisch gesicherten 
Wirkungen der Reform hinsichtlich der abhängigen Beschäftigung. Es gibt jedoch Indizien 
für eine schwach negative Entwicklung. Die Studie betont allerdings die Notwendigkeit einer 
vorsichtigen Interpretation der Ergebnisse, da ausführliche Tests zweifeln lassen, ob die für 
die Verwendung dieser Methode die notwendigen statistischen Annahmen als erfüllt gelten 
können. 
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3.5 Ausbildung 
Müller (2016)
62
 zeigt deskriptiv, dass sich in den deregulierten Zweigen der Anteil der 
Neugründer mit Meisterabschluss von rund 75% vor 2004 (wobei die restlichen 25% 
Ausnahmegenehmigungen zur Betriebsgründung besaßen) auf rund 20% nach 2004 reduziert; 
der Anteil der Neugründer mit Gesellenabschluss beträgt in den Jahren nach der Reform noch 
rund 70%. Er schließt daher auf negative Effekte der Reform auf das durchschnittliche 
Qualifikationsniveau der Betriebsinhaber im Handwerk. 
Koch & Nielen (2017)
63
 bestätigen den erwarteten negativen Reformeffekt auf die Anzahl der 
Meisterprüfungen. Die Autoren zeigen zugleich, dass es in den ersten Jahren nach der Reform 
keine signifikanten Effekte der Reform auf das Ausbildungsgeschehen gab. Erst ab 2009 ist 
ein negativer Reformeffekt auf die Zahl der Ausbildungsplätze und die Zahl der 
Auszubildenden erkennbar, welcher laut den Autoren aufgrund der zeitlichen Entfernung 
nicht zwangsläufig auf die Reform zurückgeführt werden kann. Es werden ebenfalls keine 
signifikanten Wirkungen auf die Zahl der Gesellenabschlussprüfungen gefunden. Die 
verspätete Wirkung lässt sich allerdings damit begründen, dass aufgrund einer zeitlich 
befristeten Ausnahmeregelung auch nicht-Meistergeführte Betriebe in B1-Handwerken bis 
2009 ausbilden durften und der negative Reformeffekt daher erst ab 2009 zu erwarten wäre.
64
 
Auf Basis von IAB-Daten stellen die Autoren zunächst sogar positive Wirkungen der 
Handwerksnovelle auf das Ausbildungsverhalten der Betriebe in den deregulierten B1-
Handwerken fest
65
, welche sich aber im Folgenden als nicht robust herausstellen. Insgesamt 
bleibt festzuhalten, dass die Effekte der Reform auf die Zahl der Meisterprüfungen negativ 
und die Effekte auf das Ausbildungsgeschehen uneindeutig ausfallen.  
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3.6 Effektivität marktendogener Informationsmechanismen 
Röber (2009)
66
 untersucht, ob bei der Interaktion mit verschiedenen Gewerken beim privaten 
Hausbau marktendogene Instrumente genutzt werden, um Informationsasymmetrien 
abzubauen. Sie findet, dass insbesondere Reputation und persönliche Empfehlungen bzw. 
Bauunternehmer für bei der Betriebsauswahl entscheidend sind. Sie argumentiert, dass der 
Meisterbrief allein hingegen keine umfassende Lösung bietet, da auch in weiterhin regulierten 
Märkten durch Verbraucher Informationsasymmetrien wahrgenommen werden.  
Fredriksen et al. (i.E.) nutzen Kundenbewertungen auf der Online-Plattform MyHammer.de, 
um die Qualität der Handwerksleistungen zu messen. Ihre Befunde unterstützen die Annahme, 
dass Meisterbetriebe eine höhere Leistungsqualität anbieten, da Meisterbetriebe bessere 
Kundenbewertungen erzielen und länger auf der Plattform verbleiben. Die Autoren 
argumentieren, dass die Unterscheidung zwischen Meister- und Nicht-Meisterunternehmen 
den Kunden dabei hilft, eine für sie passende Preis-Qualitäts-Kombination zu finden. Diese 
Verminderung der informatorischen (Such-) Kosten für den Kunden wirkt dadurch einem 
Marktversagen auf Grund von Informationsasymmetrien entgegen.   
4. Fazit und Forschungsausblick 
Knapp fünfzehn Jahre nach der Reform der Handwerksordnung ist es möglich, eine erste 
Bilanz über die Reformeffekte zu ziehen.  
Auffällig ist, dass der überwiegende Teil der Studien die Effekte der Deregulierung aus der 
Wettbewerbsperspektive beleuchtet, wobei ein Teil der wirtschaftspolitisch relevanten 
theoretischen Annahmen empirisch überprüft wurde. Hierbei zeigt sich, dass die Beseitigung 
von Marktzutrittsbeschränkungen eine Gründungswelle in dem vollständig deregulierten Teil 
des Handwerks auslöste. Die Abschaffung der Meisterpflicht für die neuen Gründer 
begünstigte dabei den Markteintritt von niedriger qualifizierten Personen und Migranten. Die 
verstärkte Wettbewerbsintensität in Verbindung mit der niedrigeren Humankapitalausstattung 
der neuen Gründer fällt mit einer Erhöhung der Marktaustrittsraten zusammen. Wenngleich es 
Indizien für sehr leichte negative Effekte auf die Zahl der abhängig Beschäftigten vorliegen, 
sind diese Ergebnisse nicht statistisch gesichert. Die Ergebnisse in Bezug auf das 
Ausbildungsgeschehen fallen ebenfalls uneindeutig aus. Unstrittig ist hingegen der negative 
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Reformeffekt auf die Zahl der bestandenen Meisterprüfungen. Schließlich zeigen sich in den 
meisten Studien negative Einkommenseffekte der Reform, die allerdings oft nur schwach 
signifikant und in absoluten Werten eher gering ausfallen. 
Im Gegensatz zu den wettbewerbsökonomisch geprägten Fragestellungen bestehen im 
Bereich der Marktversagensperspektive grundlegende Forschungslücken. Die zwei 
bestehenden Studien zeigen in begrenztem Rahmen, dass marktendogene 
Informationsmechanismen bestehen, die geeignet sind, Informationsasymmetrien abzubauen. 
Es ist allerdings bislang offen, ob die Abschaffung qualifikationsbezogener 
Marktzutrittsbarrieren zu einer Senkung der durchschnittlichen Qualität geführt hat, ob diese 
ggf. mit den Konsumentenpräferenzen übereinstimmt oder Folge eines Problems 
asymmetrischer Information ist. Ferner fehlt eine Analyse der Problematik externer Effekte 
im Falle absinkender Qualität der handwerklichen Dienstleistungen, wie etwa 
Gesundheitsschädigungen, negative Umwelteffekte durch Verwendung günstigerer 
Materialien oder im Aggregat erhöhte Reparaturkosten.  
Abschließend kann deswegen festgehalten werden, dass die wirtschaftspolitische Debatte zur 
Deregulierung der Handwerksordnung von 2004 auf einem ersten soliden wissenschaftlichen 
Fundament geführt werden kann. Es besteht jedoch weiterhin in zentralen Bereichen 
Forschungsbedarf, um die Folgen der Deregulierung insgesamt beurteilen zu können und 
empirisch fundierte Empfehlungen zur Weiterentwicklung der Handwerksordnung zu geben. 
